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This study analyzes the Navy’s Tuition Assistance (TA) program, which is the 
largest component of the Voluntary Education (VOLED) program. Mehay and Pema 
(2009) analyzed the impact of participation in the TA program on retention and 
promotion outcomes for first term Sailors and find that TA users have a higher retention 
and promotion probabilities than non-users.  This study extends their analysis in several 
ways.  First, while the prior study analyzed all TA courses, this study focuses on 
differences in the effects of TA classes delivered via distance learning (DL) versus via 
traditional classrooms.  Second, we examine student learning outcomes as well as 
career outcomes.  Finally, we apply accepted statistical techniques to control for self-
selection into DL classes in the multivariate models. 
Interest in course instructional methods has been stimulated by the rapid growth 
in DL courses in the TA program and establishment of the Navy College Distance 
Learning Partnership (NCDLP).  Between 2000 and 2007 the number of DL classes 
grew ten-fold and became the dominant mode of instruction in TA classes.  The shift to 
primarily online instruction poses several concerns for policymakers.  The major is that 
the literature indicates that course completion rates and student learning are frequently 
lower in DL classes.  Thus, the shift to DL classes may reduce the return to the Navy on 
the resources invested in the TA program.   
Research on differences in academic performance between online and traditional 
courses has been inconclusive.  Russell (2002) lists hundreds of studies that find no 
significant differences in student performance across modes of instruction, whereas a 
more recent review (Department of Education, 2009) finds that online students perform 
better.  However, critics contend that casual implications cannot be drawn due to 
weaknesses in research methodology.  One meta-analysis of DL studies concludes 
that, “overall, the 232 studies reviewed were judged to be of poor methodological 
quality” (Bernard et al., 2004).  A major problem in these studies is the failure to control 
for self-selection of students who voluntarily choose a class based on the instructional 
method.  Studies that have statistically adjusted for sample selectivity, find that student 
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performance is lower in online classes (Coates et al., 2004). In all of the multivariate 
models in this study we apply accepted statistical techniques to adjust for sample 
selectivity.   
Our analysis of retention estimates separate models for long-term reenlistments, 
short-term extensions, and an overall retention measure which combines reenlistment 
and extensions. To mitigate bias from unobservable individual characteristics driving TA 
participation, we focus on samples of TA participants.  These individuals signal a shared 
interest in additional education; however, not all students who enroll in TA courses 
complete them.  ‘Non-completers’ constitute a natural control group who reveal their 
propensity for education, but whose educational attainment does not change as a result 
of their participation in TA. Using non-completers for the control group minimizes 
selection problems because non-completers and completers should be similar in terms 
of motivation, initiative, and circumstances at the time of enrollment.  
We analyze promotion to E-5 because achieving this rank reflects superior job 
performance. Sample selectivity bias is also a concern in estimating promotion 
outcomes.  Also, retention decisions differ from promotion outcomes in that promotions 
can occur multiple times during the first term, and they do not occur at fixed points in 
time. To deal with these problems we create a panel data set composed of annual 
snapshots of each new recruit from entry until expiration of their four-year contracts.  
Panel data allow us to analyze the effect of taking a TA class over time on subsequent 
promotion outcomes. In addition, we can difference out individual fixed effects, which 
include unobservables such as ability and motivation. 
Data for the retention and promotion models is drawn from DMDC enlisted files 
on new recruits who accessed between 1994 and 2007.  Data on TA courses and 
enrollees is drawn from the Navy College Management Information System (NCMIS) 
database.   
As measures of student academic performance we use course completion rates 
and course grades (GPA).  A ‘noncompletion’ occurs if the course grade is ‘F,’’I,’ or ‘W.’.  
Bias would be eliminated if students were randomly assigned to classes.  However, in 
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the TA program students choose the classes and instructional method and this choice is 
based in part on their comparative advantage in one instructional method over another.  
To control for sample selectivity, we analyze learning outcomes using course-level data 
on the 1.6 million TA-funded college courses between 1995 and 2008, taken by 233,459 
different Sailors.  The models are estimated using fixed effects techniques.   
The key results from the estimated course completion model are based on the 
preferred fixed effects models estimated on a sample of TA users only.  The fixed 
effects estimates indicate that taking a DL class is associated with a 6.5 percentage 
point (or 8%) lower completion rate (compared to a traditional class.  In the grade point 
(GPA) models the preferred fixed effects estimates suggest that taking a DL class is 
associated with a letter grade that is .26 points (on a 1.0-4.0 scale) lower.  Since the 
average grade in the sample is 3.18 (slightly above a B), taking an online class reduces 
this to a 2.92 (slightly below a B).   
In the probit reenlistment model, when the sample includes all enlistees, the 
estimates suggest that those who take at least one TA class are more likely to reenlist 
by 28 points (a 70% difference).  When the sample is restricted to only TA users, the 
estimated reenlistment effect is only 11 points.  This difference highlights the size of the 
selection bias in the estimates in unadjusted estimates.  In the preferred models, we 
find that both DL and non-DL completers are more likely to reenlist, but that the 
marginal effect is much larger for DL completers than for non-DL completers (24 points 
versus 1.7 points, respectively). 
The probit models of extensions find that those who ever use TA are 6 points 
less likely to extend than non-users, but after adjusting for sample selectivity the 
difference falls to 3 points.  In the preferred estimates, the effect of passing a DL class 
has a much larger effect on reducing extensions (a 10 point difference) than passing a 
traditional class.  In the aggregate retention model, the results find that passing at least 
one TA course yields a 6.6 point increase in the overall retention probability.  The effect 
of passing a DL class increases retention by 11 points. 
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The promotion models are estimated with panel data and fixed effects 
techniques.  We find that promotion is positively affected by TA use, but the effect is 
largely due to self-selection by students.  TA effects drop substantially when we restrict 
attention to the sample of TA enrollees, and become insignificant when we net out 
individual fixed effects. When separating the effect of online versus traditional courses, 
we find that DL has a large positive effect on promotions, even net of unobserved 
individual ability, whereas taking traditional courses has no effect. 
We find that TA participation increases long-term reenlistments and reduces 
extensions, much like selective reenlistment bonuses.  TA use also appears to increase 
the probability of promotion to E5, but this effect is only observed for those who pass DL 
courses.  This suggests that the availability of online courses helps Sailors balance 
work demands and course taking.   The analysis also finds that DL classes are 
associated with lower course completion rates and with lower grades.  
Our results could be explained by a combination of factors. It could be that DL 
courses allow sailors to manage time such that, while course performance suffers, job 
performance does not, or at least not as much as when taking traditional courses. This 
could be because DL courses allow more choice in time allocation between education 
and work. Another reason could be that the availability of online courses attracts 
individuals who are more attached to the military and who otherwise would not have 
taken college courses if it would have impaired their job performance.  
On balance, the answer to the question of whether the shift to online classes has 
generated net positive benefits to the Navy appears to be a qualified ‘Yes.’  Those who 
take online classes have lower completion rates and lower course grades but these 
costs must be balanced against the enhanced job performance of those who complete 
the courses.  A second benefit of the expansion of DL courses is the improved access 
to college classes for Sailors in environments where traditional classrooms may not be 
feasible.  These latter benefits likely exceed the cost of the reduced educational value 
from DL classes. Finally, if online classes offered under NCDLP are linked more closely 
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to Navy ratings than traditional classes were before NCDLP, the increase in specific 
human capital also will help offset any reductions in course quality or student learning.  
To improve completion rates, we recommend that Navy College counselors 
attempt to screen applicants for DL classes, especially for those who have not 
previously taken a DL class and those who are in their first term of service.  Tighter 
screening should improve completion rates, student learning and, ultimately, job 
performance, which would increase the return to the Navy from the TA program. 
In addition, it would be useful to analyze why students are failing to complete 
their classes, and whether non-completion is due to withdrawals or incompletes, or due 
to failing grades.  An analysis of non-completers could identify whether non-completion 
is due to difficulty of the course subject and material in an online setting, or whether it is 
due to time-management problems for the student. 
While this study has analyzed key outcomes of the TA program and it appears 
that net benefits of the TA program are positive, we recommend further study of the 
benefits and costs of the TA program.  In addition, the net benefits of the NCDLP 
program should be evaluated separately.  Further studies should expand the analyses 































Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ........................................................... v 
Table of Contents .............................................................. xi 
II.  Background and Literature Review ............................. 7 
III. DISTANCE EDUCATION IN THE TUITION ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 12 
IV. Data and Multivariate Models ............................... 31 
V. Statistical Results.................................................. 47 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations................... 62 
 
List of Figures (cont.) 
Figure 14.  Completion Rates in Physical Science Classes 
in DL and Other Classes by Year............................................................................28 
Figure 15.  Course Completion Rates by Pay Grade and Year...............................29 
Figure 16.  Course Completion Rates by Gender by Year ......................................30 
 xii
List of Tables 
Table 1 . College Courses Taken via TA Program,  
by Instructional Method .............................................................................................4 
 
Table 2.  Participation Rates in DL and Traditional Classes,  
by Gender ...............................................................................................................21 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Samples of All Recruits and  
Recruits Who Enrolled in TA ...................................................................................44 
 
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of TA Users Only............................45 
 
Table 5.  Course Completion Models ......................................................................47 
Table 6.  Model of Course Grades (GPA) ...............................................................49 
Table 7.  Probit Model of TA Participation by Course Type.....................................52 
Table 8.  Probit Reenlistment Models......................................................................55 
Table 9.  Probit Extension Models...........................................................................57 
Table 10.  Probit Retention Models 
(Reenlistments and Extensions)..............................................................................59 









                                  THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
  1
I.  Introduction 
The Navy’s Voluntary Education Program (VOLED) supports off-duty college and 
other classes for enlisted sailors and officers.  In FY 2007, the Navy spent 
approximately $103 million on the VOLED program, which supported classes taken by 
approximately 64,000 active duty personnel.  The primary goal of the VOLED program 
is to cultivate the career potential of its Sailors.  The focus of this study is the Tuition 
Assistance (TA) program, which is by far the largest component of the VOLED program. 
Between FY 2000 and FY 2007, enrollment in undergraduate courses via TA grew by 
50%. By FY 2008, 52,481 Navy enlisted personnel enrolled in 152,698 classes with 
assistance from the TA program.1  
Sailors who complete undergraduate college courses via the TA program 
increase their general human capital.  Numerous studies have found that increased 
educational attainment increases individuals’ job performance, productivity, and 
earnings (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2010).  Hence, we expect that completing college 
classes via the Navy’s TA program will have similar effects on service members’ military 
job performance.  However, college classes also improve employment opportunities in 
the civilian labor market, which may reduce retention. 
Mehay and Pema (2009) analyze the impact of participation in the TA program 
on retention and promotion outcomes for first-term sailors. They find that TA courses 
increase sailors’ probability of promotion to E4 and E5.  They conclude that this 
                                            
1Based on data from the NCMIS database. 
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promotion effect tends to improve internal career prospects, which offsets the increase 
in external labor market opportunities. As a result, the program boosts first term 
retention rates of sailors.  
This study extends Mehay and Pema (2009) in several ways:  First, whereas the 
prior study looked at all TA courses, we focus on the effects of classes delivered via 
distance learning (DL) and compare these effects to those of classes delivered in 
traditional classrooms. Second, this study compares course completion rates and 
grades of students in DL and traditional classes, generating implications for current 
policies that are emphasizing distance education.   
Interest in the mode of instruction has been stimulated by the rapid growth in the 
number of distance learning (DL) courses being taken via the Navy’s TA program.  As 
Table 1 shows, between FY 2000 and FY 2007 the number of DL classes taken by 
Sailors via the Tuition Assistance Program grew ten-fold whereas the number of 
traditional classes fell by 29%.  By FY 2006, for the first time, enrollment in 
undergraduate college classes taught via distance learning exceeded enrollment in 
courses taught in traditional classroom settings.   
The shift to DL appears to have been fueled by policies to expand the number of 
online classes. In 1999, the Navy formally established formal partnerships with 
postsecondary institutions to provide degrees online.  These partnerships eventually 
evolved into the Navy College Program Distance Learning Partnership (NCDLP) 
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program.2  This program created formal relationships with a few postsecondary 
institutions to provide degree programs, with all courses delivered via distance 
education.  In addition, each postsecondary institution agreed to offer either an 
associate or bachelor degree and to link each degree with specific enlisted ratings.  In 
2004, the program expanded to include 17 institutions and 96 degree programs, and in 
2007 it doubled to include 34 institutions offering 264 degree programs.3  For example, 
Central Texas College, a two-year college, offers 15 online A.A. degree programs for 15 
ratings (CS, FC, IT, JU, MA, MU, NC, NC/Duty Counselor, OS, QM, SB, SH, SK, SO, 
YN).4 
The stimulus behind offering more online courses was due, at least in part, to the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT), which increased the deployment of Sailors to locations 
with limited access to traditional college classrooms.  However, the new policy also 
linked college classes and degrees to Navy ratings. In principle, this change made the 
classes more job-related and thus made the education less general in nature and more 
job-specific.  Prior to the establishment of NCPDL, the program did not formally link 
college courses with Navy ratings nor did it require that college courses or degrees be 
job-related.  Rather, counselors required students to develop an ‘education plan’ to 
                                            
2 Personal correspondence with Ronald C. Smith, Navy Voluntary Distance Education Program Manager, 
Center for Personal and Professional Development, 19 October 2009. 
3 For a list of the 34 institutions currently in the NCPDLP and the ratings supported by each institution, 
see http://www.navycollege.navy.mil/storefront.cfm (accessed January 12, 2010). 
4 For details see http://ww.ctcd.edu/NP_ctc1.htm (accessed January 12, 2010). 
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guide their college course choices, but the plan was not binding on student course 
decisions.5   
While the postsecondary institutions in the NCPDL partnership have identified 
degree programs for individual ratings, in many cases the degrees and the ‘related’ 
courses are still in very general subjects.  For example, the degree offered by Central 
Texas University for the OS (Operations Specialist) rating is in “General Studies,” and 
the degree offered for the SB (Special Warfare Boat Operator) rating is in “Business 
Management.”  The relationship between the degree program and the skills needed in 
these ratings is often weak.  The actual specificity of the degrees appears to vary widely 
across ratings and schools, and the effect of this policy change remains to be 
determined.  
Table 1. College Courses Taken via TA Program, by Instructional Method 
FY Overall Traditional DL 
1995 102,712 102,668 44 
1996 90,129 90,060 69 
1997 93,578 92,397 1,181 
1998 100,363 96,838 3,525 
1999 101,241 95,509 5,732 
2000 105,571 97,355 8,216 
2001 106,888 94,550 12,338
2002 112,002 91,980 20,022
2003 112,971 82,756 30,215
2004 131,483 84,161 47,322
2005 143,021 82,767 60,254
2006 153,731 78,569 75,162
2007 151,334 68,953 82,381
Source:  NCMIS database 
                                            
5 Beginning in 2010, the Navy intends to make educational plans ‘binding’ in that TA will only fund 
courses that are covered by the plan. 
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The shift to primarily online instruction raises several issues for policymakers.  
One issue is whether the shift to distance education has been accompanied by a 
reduction in course completion rates, an outcome that has been widely observed in the 
education literature.  If online courses have lower completion rates, then valuable 
resources may be wasted, including the sailors’ time and Navy funding.  If course 
grades and completion rates are lower in online classes, the quality and quantity of the 
additional human capital acquired by the individual may be reduced.  If so, the overall 
return to the Navy on resources invested in the VOLED program will be reduced.  Of 
course, any potential difference in returns due to lower quality must be balanced against 
the improved access to online classes for Sailors in environments where traditional 
classrooms may not be feasible.  If Sailors are able to enroll in classes that otherwise 
would not be available, this benefit may exceed the cost of the reduced educational 
value of the class.  In addition, if the online classes now being offered under the NCDLP 
program are linked more closely to Navy ratings than traditional classes were before 
NCDLP, the increase in specific human capital may to some extent offset any reduction 
in course quality.  
 This study addresses several questions. First we investigate whether course 
completion rates vary by mode of instruction.  Second, we investigate whether course 
subject and other observable characteristics of recruits affect the completion rates of DL 
and traditional classes. Third, we analyze whether, among those who complete their 
courses, the instructional method affects student learning, measured in terms of course 
grades. Next we look at the effect of participation in the TA program on job performance 
and retention and examine whether these effects depend on the course delivery 
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method.  If DL courses are more job-specific, this may increase the productivity of 
enlisted personnel.  However, any positive effect of DL courses being more job-specific 
may be offset by their lower quality or by lower completion rates.   
The study is organized as follows. Section II reviews prior studies on the effects 
of military Voluntary Education programs on the retention and performance of service 
members.  Section III provides descriptive statistics of the Navy’s TA program based on 
data files provided by the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and the 
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Section IV describes the multivariate 
statistical models used to estimate the effect of TA participation and instruction method 
on retention and promotion.  In addition, this section estimates the effects of DL courses 
and course subject on course completion rates.  The results of the multivariate models 
are discussed in Section V, and Section VI summarizes the statistical results and 




II.  Background and Literature Review 
A. Growth of Distance Education 
Previous studies have focused on the effect of participation in the Navy’s TA 
program on Sailors’ subsequent job performance, but have not discussed the possibility 
that career outcomes could vary depending on the method of instruction in the courses. 
Distance education classes have grown rapidly in postsecondary institutions since the 
mid-1990s.  During the 2006-07 academic year, 66% of 2-year and 4-year 
postsecondary institutions offered distance education courses, encompassing over 12 
million enrollments (U.S. Department of Education, 2008).  About 32% of all institutions 
offered degree or certificate programs designed to be completed via distance education.  
About 3.5 million postsecondary students took at least one online course, representing 
a 9.7% increase over the previous year.  This growth rate of online enrollments greatly 
exceeds the 1.5% growth in overall postsecondary enrollments (Allen and Seaman, 
2007; Beffa-Negrini et al, 2002).   
Reasons for the growth in distance education include the following: (1) to meet 
student demand for flexible schedules; (2) to provide access to college for students who 
otherwise would not be able to attend; (3) to make more courses available; and (4) to 
increase overall student enrollment  (U.S. Department of Education, 2008).  Key 
barriers to implementation of effective DL programs include: low faculty acceptance; 
perceived lack of discipline of DL students; and the high development costs of DL 
courses.  Low faculty acceptance appears to be based on the view that DL is a less 
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effective mode of instruction, primarily due to the lack of face-to-face interaction 
between professor and student.   
Both civilian and military studies find that completion rates for online courses are 
lower than they are for classes taught in a traditional face-to-face setting.  Although 
most civilian studies find that DL students are older than traditional students, age does 
not appear to causally affect completion rates.  Rather, DL students are more likely to 
work full-time and often choose DL classes due to work schedules (Allen and Seaman, 
2007; Dutton, et al., 2002).  Although some studies blame poor completion rates on 
student discipline, the priority of work over study appears to offer a better explanation 
for the low completion rates in DL classes.  
Work schedule was the single most important factor in predicting both 
persistence and performance of DL students and its effect was generally negative 
(Kemp, 2002).  Dutton, et al. (2002) found that 84% of DL students expected to work 
during the upcoming academic quarter as compared to only 54% of traditional students.  
In addition, for students who work, DL students expected to work almost twice as many 
hours as traditional students.  The demands of life commitments, such as children and 
work, appear to be important factors accounting for some of the difference in completion 
rates between DL and traditional students (Borstorff and Lowe, 2007).  The U.S. 
Department of Education (1999) found that children and work demands were among the 
seven situational factors which play a significant role in whether students will persist in 
college. Dutton, et al. (2002, 2005) also found that work commitments are statistically 
significant predictors of final test scores.   
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B. Academic Performance in DL Courses 
Differences in academic performance, measured mostly by class test scores, 
have been observed between DL and traditional students.  While some studies find that 
DL students do as well or better than other students in similar courses (Phipps and 
Merisotis, 1999; Dutton, et al., 2002), Russell (2002a) lists hundreds of studies that find 
no significant differences in class performance between DL and traditional students.  
Critics of this literature, however, counter that casual implications cannot be drawn due 
to the inherent weaknesses in research methodology.  After reviewing the statistical 
methodology of over 232 studies on distance education, Bernard et al. (2004) 
concluded that, “overall, the 232 studies reviewed were judged to be of poor 
methodological quality.” (p. 175).  Problems cited included: lack of random assignment, 
unreliable and invalid outcome measures, and failure to control for external factors. 
Missing exogenous variables and selection bias created by systematic differences 
between students who voluntarily choose online over traditional courses, in particular, 
make it difficult to draw reliable inferences from prior studies 
Prior studies that have adjusted for selection bias using standard statistical 
techniques have been conducted by economists in the economics of education field.  
For example, Coates et al. (2004) compared student test scores on a standardized test 
(Test of Understanding of College Economics, TUCE) for students in online and face-to-
face versions of a standard economics principles class.  The study found that students 
in instructor-led classes scored significantly better.  The authors also found that failure 
to account for self-selection into courses biases estimate effects toward zero (i.e., 
toward finding no significant differences).  In this study, we focus on applying accepted 
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statistical techniques to adjust for selection bias in our analyses of the effects of the TA 
program. 
C. Course Completion Rates  
Research on differences in completion rates across instructional methods 
generally finds lower completion rates for DL classes than for traditional classes.  
Howell et al. (2004) review several studies and find that DL completion rates range 
widely between 40% and 80%.  Brigham (2003) finds that 66% of distance learning 
institutions had better than 80% completion rates and 87% of institutions had better than 
70% completion rates.   
Differences in completion rates may be due to how the rates are calculated.  
Kemp (2002) defines non-completers as those who signed up for a course and either 
did not complete the course or received a failing grade, including those who dropped 
the course within the official ‘no penalty’ drop period.  This definition resulted in an 
overall course completion rate of 36%.  However, if students who dropped the course 
later and those who never submitted a single assignment (‘non-starters’) are removed 
from the sample, the completion rate jumps to 97%.   
D. Student Satisfaction 
Student satisfaction is important in course evaluation because it can affect 
student commitment, learning, and perseverance. Several studies find that students 
show a slight preference for a traditional education setting, while others find student 
satisfaction is similar in DL and face-to-face classrooms (Beffa-Negrini et al. 2002; 
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Borstorff and Lowe, 2007).  The literature does suggest that, in general, student 
satisfaction and success is greater the richer the delivery media.  However, a meta-
analysis found that in DL classes may not lead to more effective instruction (Allen et al., 
2002).  Although the amount and ease of communication affects student satisfaction, 
the richness of the media, such as video teleconferencing versus e-mail, did not 
significantly affect satisfaction.  The study further implies that a switch from face-to-face 
to online instruction should not reduce student satisfaction and should not interfere with 
completion rates (Allen et al., 2002). 
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III. DISTANCE EDUCATION IN THE TUITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM  
The data on TA use were provided by NETC and were drawn from the Navy 
College Management Information System (NCMIS) database.  The database included 
information on 1,960,592 course enrollments funded by TA for active duty Navy 
personnel between FY 1995 and FY 2008.  The sample is restricted to undergraduate 
courses, leaving 1,641,740 valid course enrollment records.   
Figure 1 shows that annual TA enrollments grew steadily between FY 1996 and 
FY 2003, increased sharply after FY 2003, then dropped slightly after 2006.  The sharp 
increase in TA participation after 2003 is mostly due to the rapid growth of DL courses 
and the increase in the tuition reimbursement rate from 75% to 100% of tuition costs.   








































Source: NCMIS database. 
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In FY 1995, only 44 classes were taught via DL; by FY 2007, 82,381 classes 
were taught online.  In the same period, the number of traditional courses dropped 
commensurately from 102,668 (FY 1995) to 68,953 (FY 2007).  Figure 1 shows that the 
number of students in DL classes first surpassed those in traditional courses in FY 
2006.   
Between FY 2000 and FY 2007, DL classes increased ten-fold while traditional 
classes fell by 29%.  By FY 2008, DL classes accounted for nearly 60% of classes 
taken by active duty enlisted sailors.  During this period, among students who took any 
TA-funded classes, the average number of classes taken per person was about three 
per year.  
Enrollment in TA grew steadily between FY 1995 and FY 2007, despite the fact 
that the Navy reduced the active duty enlisted force by approximately 100,100.  As 
Figure 2 shows, participation in the TA program grew slowly between 1995 and 2002, 
and then rose rapidly after 2002, climbing from 10% in 2003 to 18% in 2007.  
Enrollment rates in DL classes grew from 4.6% to 11.7% between 2003 and 2007, while 




Figure 2.  Overall TA Participation Rate by Fiscal Year  
Source: NCMIS 
 
A. TA Participation by Rank 
Although the Navy reduced the active duty enlisted inventory after 1995, Figure 3 
shows that reductions were not evenly distributed across pay grades.  The entry grades 
of E-1 and E-2 experienced the largest decreases in inventory (averaging 43%), while 
E-3’s experienced the smallest cuts (10%).  This may have resulted from Navy policies 
that targeted retention of experienced sailors during the various reductions-in-force.  
The fact that the mid grades were not cut as severely as the entry grades may be one 
factor fueling the growth of the TA program, since, as shown below, sailors in the middle 
grades tend to use the TA program at higher rates than those in other grades. 
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Figure 3.  Percent Reduction in Active Duty Enlisted Strength, FY 1995-2007:      
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Figure 4.  Percent Distribution of TA Participants by Rank for FY 2007.  
Source NCMIS 
 
Figure 4 displays the percentage distribution of TA users by pay grade for 2007.  
Raw data for the calculations in Figure 4 can be found in Appendix Tables 7 and 10.  It 
appears that TA users are concentrated in grades E-4 through E-6, which account for 
about three-fourths of all participants.  By contrast, first term enlistees in grades E-1 
through E-4 account for between 25% of all participants. 
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Figure 5.  Participation Rates in Traditional Classes by FY and Rank.  
Source: NCMIS  
 
Figure 5 describes trends in participation rates in TA-funded traditional classes 
by rank and year.  Raw data for the calculations in Figure 5 can be found in Appendix 
Table 8.  Petty Officer Second Class (E-5) through Senior Chief Petty Officer (E-6) have 
consistently participated at the highest rates in traditional classes, maintaining at least a 
5 point gap with E-3s during the FY1995-FY2007 period.  The entry pay grade of E-1 
consistently has the lowest participation rate (averaging less than 2%). 
Figure 6 shows trends in participation rates in TA-funded DL classes by grade 
and year.  Participation rates in DL classes are higher for E-7s and E-8s (averaging 
20.5%) and lower in the junior grades.  Figures 5 and 6 show that the gaps in 
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participation rates in traditional classes between ranks E-3 and E-8 (1.4% gap) are 
smaller than are the gaps in DL classes between ranks (3% gap).  The larger gaps in 
DL classes may be due to differences in maturity and career status in the higher ranks.   
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Figure 6.  Distance Learning Participation Rates by Rank and FY.  
Source: NCMIS 
 
B. TA Participation by Gender 
The diversity of the Navy active duty enlisted force has grown in recent years. 
During the 13-year period covered by this study, the representation of women in the 
Navy grew from 11.6% to 14.3%. During the military drawdown, overall the active duty 
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enlisted force fell by 26%; however, the number of women fell by only 8% while the 
number of men dropped by 28%. 
Figure 7 displays overall TA participation rates by gender, while Table 2 
summarizes gender-based differences in participation rates by fiscal year and 
instruction method.  Raw data for the calculations in Figure 7 and Table 2 are displayed 
in Appendix Table 12.  The data shows that women consistently participate in TA at 
nearly double the rate of men.  This may be due in part to women attempting to 
increase their net value to the Navy, perhaps to compensate for being restricted from 
participating in combat-related occupations.  These occupational restrictions may hinder 
their promotion opportunities. Alternatively, women may participate at higher rates 
because they are assigned primarily to shore-based occupations that offer more 
opportunities to use TA.  Participation rates by men grew by 8% whereas rates for 
women surged by 17% during the DL expansion period (Figure 12).  Figure 2 shows 
that participation in DL classes grew by 8% for men but by 17% for women. Although 
men accounted for nearly 86% of the force in FY 2007, they participated in only 75% of 
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Table 2.  Participation Rates in DL and Traditional Classes, by Gender 
 
C. TA Participation by Race/Ethnicity 
Between FY 1995 and 2007 the Navy increased its racial and ethnic diversity.  In 
FY 1995, Caucasians accounted for 68.2% of the enlisted force, but by 2007, they 
accounted for only 53% of all enlistees.  During this same period the representation of 
Hispanics in the Navy grew dramatically from 7% to 15% of the enlisted force.  The data 
also indicate that TA participation rates vary by race and ethnicity.  Minorities, with the 
exception of Native Americans, participate in the TA program at higher rates than 
whites.  Also, as Figure 8 shows, minorities participate in traditional classes at higher 
rates than whites. Raw data for Fig. 8 are available in Appendix Table 13.  For example, 
in recent years African Americans and Hispanics have participated in traditional TA 
classes at rates 3% to 4% points higher than whites.6   
 
                                            
6 Significant changes in coding of races and ethnicity occurred after FY 2003.  The number of service members 
coded with “Unknown” or “Other” was 5,496 in FY 2004 dropping to 3,364 by FY 2007 using the same coding 
standard.  This may have had subtle inflationary effects on minority participation rates in FY 2004 and FY 2005 
when coding practices were adjusted. 
  DL Participation Rates by Gender   
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Female 3.41% 4.99% 8.66% 12.59% 16.00% 18.43% 20.44% 
Male 1.57% 2.28% 3.89% 5.90% 7.71% 9.40% 10.28% 
  Traditional Participation Rates by Gender   
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Female 14.28% 16.47% 18.72% 18.58% 17.88% 16.77% 15.15% 
Male 8.15% 7.69% 8.65% 8.49% 8.55% 8.14% 7.45% 
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Figure 8.  Participation Rates in Traditional Classes by Race.  
Source: NCMIS  
Figure 9 shows that minority participation in DL classes has grown substantially 
since FY 1995. In particular, African Americans increased their participation in DL from 
1.4% in 1995 to 13.7% in FY 2007.  In FY 2006 and FY 2007, Hispanic overall 
participation rates in TA dropped.  This may be due to Hispanic representation in the 
Navy being at an all time high in FY 2007, while Hispanic participation in TA remained 
stable.  
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Figure 9.  Participation Rates in DL Classes by Race.  
Source: NCMIS. 
 
D. TA Participation Rates by Course Subject 
The NCMIS data file contains the names nearly 2 million courses taken by TA-
funded students between FY 1995 and FY 2008.  We aggregated course names into 11 
broad categories to provide an overview of the course subjects taken by Sailors. The 11 
categories of subjects we identified are: Business, History, Math, Natural Sciences, 
Physical Sciences, Information Technology, Humanities, English, Medical, Technical 
(undergraduate) and Law. Using the most recent fiscal year in the NCMIS data (2008), 
several significant differences in the methods of instruction for each subject were noted.  
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Figures 10 and 11 display the distribution of course subjects taught via traditional and 
via DL methods, respectively, in 2007.  Raw data for Figures 10-11 are displayed in 
Appendix Table 14. 
























Figure 10.  Distribution of Course Subject in Traditional Classes, FY 2007. 
Source: NCMIS 
 
Figures 10 and 11 indicate that students are more likely to enroll in traditional 
classes for English, Physical Sciences, Math, and Technical courses.  The largest 
difference is observed for English courses, which are three times as likely to be taught 
face-to-face as online. Humanities and Information Technology courses are more likely 
to be delivered via DL. 
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Figure 11.  Distribution of Course Subject in DL Classes, 2007. Source: NCMIS 
 
These differences may be due in part to a lack of course offerings by educational 
institutions for classes that require extensive lab work or a ‘hands-on’ approach.  Figure 
12 shows that the growth of DL courses has been most rapid in the Humanities, 
Business, and Information Technology subjects.  Appendix Table 15 contains the raw 
data for Figure 12.   
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Figure 12.   Distribution of DL Courses by Subject and Year. Source: NCMIS 
 
E. TA Course Completion Rates  
 Figure 13 shows completion rates in DL and traditional classes by Fiscal 

























Figure 13.  Completion Rates for DL and Traditional Courses.  
Source: NCMIS. 
The sizeable difference in completion rates between the two instruction methods 
in 1995-1996 is influenced by the small number of DL classes in those years.  In 1997, 
the first year when a sizeable number of TA students enrolled in DL courses, the gap in 
completion rates was only 7 points.  In FY 2000 the gap was 9 points and by 2007 it 
was about 6 points. The slight decrease in the gap between the two types of courses 
may reflect improvements in the delivery of DL classes by educational institutions and 
improvements in access to computers and the internet for Sailors.  
Differences in completion rates by subject area also have diminished.  For 
example, in physical science classes, Figure 20 shows that the gap in completion rates 
was nearly 15 percentage points in 2002 but only 7 points in 2006.  
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Figure 14.  Completion Rates in Physical Science Classes in DL and Other   
Classes by Year.  
 
Figure 15, which depicts completion rates by the pay grade of the student, shows 
that junior sailors (E1-E3) consistently have lower course pass rates than more senior 
sailors.   
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Figure 15.  Course Completion Rates by Pay Grade and Year. 
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 Figure 16.  Course Completion Rates by Gender by Year. 
In summary, participation in the TA program grew steadily between fiscal years 
1995 and 2007 even though the active duty enlisted force fell by over 100,000 sailors.  
The number of courses offered via DL grew by ten-fold after 2000.  E-5s and E-6s have 
the highest TA participation rates in the enlisted ranks.  Overall, females and minorities 
participate in TA at higher rates than white males.  Finally, completion rates for DL 




IV. Data and Multivariate Models 
This section discusses the multivariate statistical models used to estimate the 
effect of TA participation on the selected outcomes. The section discusses the final data 
set used for the statistical analyses, explains the estimation methodology, and identifies 
the relevant treatment and control groups used to obtain program effects for each of the 
selected outcome measures.  
A.  Retention Models  
 We create three variables to identify sailors who stay in the Navy beyond 
their initial 4-year contract.  The first variable captures short-term extensions (less than 
3 years in length).  This variable allows us to test whether those who participate in the 
TA program complete additional years of service beyond their initial 4-year contracts, 
even though they do not sign long-term reenlistment contracts. The sample for this 
model includes all new recruits who entered during the period 1994-2004. From the 
point of view of the organization, sailors who extend, although they do not sign a 
reenlistment contract, are contributing their human capital (including any additions due 
to TA participation) to the organization.  
  The second retention variable captures those who sign long-term 
reenlistment contracts. This allows us to capture those who commit to more years of 
service since long-term contracts can vary from 3 to 6 years of additional service.  This 
variable was created utilizing the Interservice Separation Code (ISC) code for the first 
listed date of separation.  The third retention variable captures both long-term 
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reenlistments and short-term extensions. This allows us to analyze if TA usage is linked 
to any increase in years of effective military service beyond the expiration of the initial 
contract. It also allows us to capture the overall effect of TA on length of service in case 
the program has differential effects on extensions and reenlistments.  
Dealing with Selection Bias.  The focus of this study is on the effect of 
completion of TA classes on selected outcome indicators, including retention and 
promotion, and potential differences in these effects across modes of instruction.  A 
critical issue in obtaining unbiased statistical estimates of program effects is the 
confounding effect of self selection by TA students.  To model retention, ideally we want 
to estimate the effect of TA as: 
1 1 1, , , 1 , , , 0                                                    (1)ATT E y X M A TA E y X M A TAé ù é ù= = - =ë û ë û
 
where y1 denotes a specific outcome. However, since we cannot observe the 
outcomes of TA participants in the absence of treatment, we can obtain program effects 
by approximating the counterfactual with the outcomes of non-participants: 
2 1 0, , , 1 , , , 0                                                    (2)ATT E y X M A TA E y X M A TAé ù é ù= = - =ë û ë û
 
where y0 denotes outcomes for non-TA users, X includes demographics (race, 
ethnicity, gender, marital status, dependents, and an interaction of the last two 
variables), M represents military-specific variables, and A represents ability and 
motivation, which is proxied by AFQT scores. TA is an indicator of program 
participation.  
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Bias in estimates of ATT2 can stem from both observable and unobservable 
factors. Prior studies have focused on potential differences in unobservable factors 
between TA participants and non-participants (Buddin and Kapur, 2002).  The concern 
is that higher-ability sailors will pursue more education and also will have better job 
performance.  Hence, estimates of the effect of additional education (via TA) will tend to 
be biased. Although we include AFQT scores in the model to proxy for ability, other 
unobservable characteristics of individuals, such as motivation, perseverance, learning 
style, or other dimensions of cognitive ability, may remain in ui. 
 To deal with selection bias and to focus on average treatment effects for 
the typical participant (ATTs) we exploit a unique feature of the data to create the 
comparison group.  First, to mitigate the bias from unobservable factors driving program 
participation, we focus solely on those enroll in the TA program.  These individuals 
signal a similar propensity for additional education. However, not all of those who enroll 
in TA-supported courses complete those courses.  We exploit the information on course 
completers and noncompleters to construct control and treatment groups based on 
whether educational attainment actually changes due to their enrollment in TA. Thus, 
we propose ATT3 below as an approximation for ATT1:  
3 11 10, , , 1, 1 , , , 1, 0                              (3)ATT E y X M A TA P E y X M A TA Pé ù é ù= = = - = =ë û ë û
 
where P indicates whether the recruit passes at least one TA course, which 
reveals the potential and opportunity to complete courses, conditional on work 
schedules and other contingencies unobservable to us. In (3), y11 represents outcomes 
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for TA users who complete at least one course, while y10 represents outcomes for TA 
users who complete none of their courses.  
 ‘Non-completers’ constitute a natural control group who reveal their 
propensity for education, but whose educational attainment does not change as a result 
of their participation in the TA program. Using non-completers to construct the control 
group minimizes selection problems because non-completers and completers are 
similar in terms of motivation, initiative, and circumstances at the time of enrollment.    In 
our definition, ‘completers’ include those who fail to complete some, but not all, of their 
courses. We interpret this to mean that they have the opportunity to complete courses, 
despite work demands or other unforeseen circumstances. In our data, 48,876 
individuals enroll in TA, but 20% of enrollees are ‘non-completers.’   
The justification for this research design is based in part on the observation that 
many of the events that disrupt course completion – deployments, transfers, changes in 
work schedules, and medical problems, for example – are exogenous.  With respect to 
deployments, Lyle (2005) demonstrates that deployment decisions in the Army are 
exogenous to individual decision-making because they are made at the unit (battalion) 
level.  This argument applies equally to the Navy because sailors also deploy according 
to unit (ship) schedules. In addition, even when sailors can anticipate deployment 
schedules, return dates are far less predictable, which can interfere with education 
plans.   
 Another reason non-completion may be randomly distributed among TA 
users is that 18- to 20-year olds in general may simply be bad planners.  For example, 
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evidence finds that civilian community college students frequently drop or fail classes, 
often due to unforeseen events.7  If sailors behave the same as their civilian 
counterparts, their course drop rates may be due less to ability than to their lack of 
foresight in anticipating changes.8   
In summary, restricting the sample to TA users helps to control for unmeasured 
skills and preferences.  It is assumed that individuals linked by enrollment in the TA 
program share more similar abilities and preferences than randomly selected 
individuals, in which case our design controls for many unobservables affecting 
participation. The design also controls for qualification for college-level classes because 
all TA users meet enrollment criteria.  These data allow us to exploit what may be 
largely exogenous variation in TA completion to obtain unbiased measures of the effect 
of additional education on career outcomes. 
Although our approach has several advantages in controlling for important 
unobservables, there may still be pre-treatment differences between TA users and non-
users. Even though all TA users have a similar interest in further education and face 
similar hardships of long and varying work schedules and deployments, completers 
somehow managed to successfully finish their classes.  They may succeed either 
because they have better career prospects in the military and wish to use education to 
                                            
7 Brock et al. (2007) analyze the records of 66,129 entering community college students in 2002 and find 
that the mean completion rate over three years for individual courses was 70%.  Matus-Grossman and 
Gooden (2002) discuss the reasons cited by community college students for dropping courses.  
8 Note, too, that many college classes are now offered to TA enrollees via distance learning.  Since 
sailors often take these classes while on lengthy and demanding deployments, they may miscalculate the 
time and effort necessary to complete the DL classes within the allotted time. 
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advance in their careers, or because they are accumulating human capital in 
preparation for leaving the military, or because they have higher ability.  Hence, 
outcomes for noncompleters may still overstate or understate outcomes that would have 
accrued to participants had they foregone program participation. However, with forces 
working in opposite directions within a relatively homogeneous population, our 
contention is that the net bias will be small. 
Explanatory Variables.  Our main indicator of TA participation indicates 
captures whether a sailor ever passed a TA-funded college course (pass_some).  Two 
other binary variables were created to indicate the type of class successfully completed 
by the Sailor—DL or traditional.  A priori it is unclear whether the mode of instruction 
would affect retention and promotion outcomes.  Some studies suggest that online 
courses will have positive effects on the job performance measures (retention and 
promotion).  However, this effect may stem not so much from the direct causal effect of 
instruction mode as from differences in DL and traditional students, with DL students 
tending to be more career-oriented and more mature than traditional students.  The 
Navy places greater demands on sailors as they increase in rank making decisions 
between work, family, and education increasingly difficult.  The ability to choose the time 
and location of the online course benefits the Navy by not detracting from the sailor’s 
main work responsibilities. On the other hand, prior research also shows that DL 
students are less likely to complete their courses than other students.   
We attempt to control for life and work demands using data on sailor 
demographics at the time of the retention decision.  The DMDC data contains 
information on student demographics, ability (AFQT scores), as well as proxies for work 
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and life demands, such as rating and marital status from entry into the Navy until the 
date of separation.  We include an indicator for gender because some studies indicate 
that females have lower retention and promotion rates than males.  Similarly, we include 
dummy variables for race and ethnicity (white, Black, Native American, Asian, Hispanic 
and other) to measure the effect of minority status on the outcome measures.  Based on 
prior research, we expect that marriage and children will have positive effects on the 
career outcomes as sailors will prefer a steady job and an increasing salary to maintain 
their families’ living standards.  We also include the number of dependents at the time of 
the retention decision.  We include a continuous variable for age at the time of entry into 
the Navy.   
We use AFQT scores as a measure of observed ability.  We also account for the 
educational attainment of sailors at the time of entry.  Sailors who had taken college 
courses prior to entering the Navy may have a higher interest in the TA program and 
higher aptitude for further education.  Educational attainment prior to entry into the 
military is classified in the following categories: high school diploma, no high school 
diploma, general equivalency diploma (GED), and one or more completed college 
courses.  Prior studies have shown that failing to obtain a high school diploma is often a 
signal of lower motivation and persistence.   
 Finally, the models include dummies for 10 broad military occupational 
specialties. We control for specialty (rating) to isolate the effect of additional general 
education from the effect of advanced skill training. Cohort dummies (FY) are also 
included to proxy for civilian labor market conditions and other unmeasured differences 
across cohorts (due, for example, to fluctuations in recruiting policies).    
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B. Promotion Models 
The promotion model captures whether the sailor is promoted to at least E-5 in 
the first term of service.  Promotions to lower pay grades are not investigated because 
these promotions are not as competitive as promotion to E-5. In contrast, promotions to 
E-5 depend on performance tests and periodic evaluations by superiors, among other 
factors (Schmitz and Moskowitz, 2008).  Furthermore, promotions to lower levels tend to 
be contemporaneous with TA participation, thus making it difficult to establish causality. 
We do not analyze promotions to pay grades above E-5 because they seldom occur 
during the first four years of service.  Self-selection into TA courses is also a concern in 
estimation of the promotion models.  Reenlistment and extension decisions differ from 
promotion outcomes in that promotions do not occur at fixed points in time.  In addition, 
sailors need to be in the sample during the entire first term to observe pay-grades 
during this period.  
Unlike the retention model, for the promotion model we create a panel data set 
composed of observations of each new recruit from time of entry until the end of the 
four-year contract.  The panel data set tracks the year-to-year pattern of TA usage and 
of promotion.  This setup allows us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity by 
using panel data methods.  More specifically, if we assume that self-selection into the 
program is driven by ability, and that ability stays relatively fixed over the period of 
observation, we can eliminate the bias in the estimates by differencing out the fixed 
effects over different time periods. Hence, our approach for dealing with sample 
selectivity bias differs in the promotion models from that adopted in the reenlistment 
models.   
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C. Data Set for Retention and Promotion Models 
The analysis sample for the retention and promotion models is drawn from two 
separate data files.  The Defense Manpower Data Center provided information on all 
new recruits who entered the Navy between FY 1994 and 2007.  Each new recruit is 
followed until separation from the Navy or September 30, 2007, which is the latest date 
of observation in our data.  Quarterly snapshots of every new recruit were available 
during this entire period.  The data include information on demographics, contract 
length, rating, promotions, AFQT scores, and dates of separation and reasons for 
separation (based on the Interservice Separation Codes (ISC)).  
The analysis data file was restricted in several ways. First, we included only 
sailors with 4-year contracts in the sample.  Sailors with longer contracts have longer 
training pipelines, which may affect their career paths, and their educational and 
retention decisions.  Second, we included only sailors who survived 36 months of 
service to ensure that sailors in the treatment and control groups had a comparable 
period of time to participate in the TA program. 
The second set of data was provided by the Navy Education and Training Center 
(NETC) and includes every TA-funded class taken by sailors between 1995 and 2008.  
The data includes course name and type, method of delivery, course status (completed, 
in progress, etc.), final grades, student demographics, and dates when the course 
commenced and when it was completed.  This data set was also restricted in several 
ways.  First, we focus only on college courses taken by enlisted service members.  To 
avoid combining remedial high school courses with college courses and graduate-level 
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courses, we also restricted the course sample to undergraduate college courses that 
were taken during the sailors’ first enlistment term. Individuals taking remedial classes 
will have different motivations and goals than those taking undergraduate courses, and 
the focus of our study is on the effects of general education on worker mobility and 
performance. 
D. Models of Learning Outcomes: Course Completions and Grades 
(GPA) 
To analyze the determinants of student academic performance as a function of 
course delivery method we analyze two different outcomes: (a) course completion rates, 
and (b) course grades (GPA).  To estimate causal effects of course delivery methods, 
we need to address the inherently different characteristics of students typically enrolling 
in DL courses from students enrolling in traditional classroom courses. It is likely that 
students choose classes based in part on their learning style or on their comparative 
advantage in one instructional method.  Hence, the learning models must account for 
unobserved differences among TA users that may be correlated with course choice.  
These unobservable, and omitted factors, may also be correlated with the learning 
outcomes, which creates biases estimates of the effect the instructional mode.   
To control for self-selection into online courses, the learning models use course-
level data, rather than individual-level, cross-sectional data.  More specifically, we 
estimate the effect of DL instruction on learning outcomes by comparing the GPA and 
course completion rates for DL and traditional classes taken by the same student. This 
way we can hold fixed all individual characteristics correlated with delivery method and 
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also unobserved ability and motivation that would influence achievement. The data for 
this model comes from the 1,960,592 TA-funded courses that Navy personnel enrolled 
in between FY 1995 and FY 2008.  The sample is restricted to enlisted personnel taking 
undergraduate college courses leaving 1,641,740 person-course-level observations. 
The model is estimated using fixed effects techniques, which control for the 
invariant and unobservable attributes of individual enrollees, such as motivation, 
perseverance, and learning style.  The fixed effects approach essentially assesses 
outcomes, such as completion rates, for each individual when the person switches 
between delivery modes over time.  That is, the effect of taking a DL class is identified 
when, in the course-person panel data, individuals take both face-to-face and DL 
courses over time.  The fixed effects method requires that both dependent and 
explanatory variables in the model vary over time. As a result, individual demographic 
characteristics, which are time-invariant, such as AFQT scores, gender, race, etc., drop 
out of the estimations.   
Binary (dummy) variables for each fiscal year also are included in the models to 
control for changes over time in military policies and other factors.  For example, the 
policy change in 2002 that increased tuition reimbursement rates from 75% to 100% 
may have affected completion rates. For example, this policy may have reduced 
completion rates if marginal sailors are enticed to enroll in classes due to the lower 
tuition costs to them.  At the same time, more sailors will be on the margin during this 
period due to the increases operational tempo from the Global War on Terror.  On the 
other hand, sailors may have become more cautious about enrolling because if they 
enroll in a class but fail it, the amount they must reimburse the Navy has increased. 
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Dummy variables for course subject also are included as predictors in the 
learning models. It could be that some courses are harder when delivered via DL or that 
some subjects are more likely to be offered in the classroom rather than via DL. The 
course subject categories are based on the following established secondary education 
categories: business, history, math, natural sciences, physical sciences, information 
technology, humanities, English, medical, technical, and miscellaneous.  To capture the 
interaction of DL with course subject in predicting course success, we also add 
interaction terms between the DL indicator variable and the course subject dummies.  
Dummy variables for rank (at the time the course was taken) also are included in 
the models.  These variables serve as proxies for work schedules and time constraints. 
Grades E-1 to E-3 were aggregated into a single category due to the small number of 
observations and due to the fact that promotions to these grades are not based on 
performance factors such as rating examinations, periodic evaluations, and board 
selection.  As E-5s constitute the largest group of TA participants, they were chosen as 
the reference category.  The literature review suggests that completion rates will 
increase with rank. Finally, since it is likely that student maturity will be a predictor of 
course completion, and that the effect of maturity will differ by subject, we also add 
interactions of DL with the pay grade dummies. 
Formally, for the course completion model, we assume that the probability of 
passing a course is determined via the following model:  
( 1| , )          (1)ij ij j ij i i t t ijt j ijtP pass X a DL Subject FY Rank a ua b g d f= = + + + + + +
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Where i denotes course, t indicates year when course was taken, j indicates 
individual, and aj represents all unobserved individual attributes that remain fixed over 
the time period observed. The unobserved individual characteristics captured by aj 
would include ability, motivation, maturity, time management skills, etc., that would 
potentially be correlated with both the likelihood of passing a course and with the 
decision to take the course online or in a traditional classroom. The fixed effects 
transformation eliminates this term (and, consequently, the source of bias). The 
estimated model also eliminates all other observable individual attributes that are fixed 
over time, such as gender, race, and AFQT scores.  
E. Descriptive Statistics 
The sample was first restricted to non-prior service recruits with 4-year contracts 
who entered the Navy between 1994 and 2003, which includes 381,455 observations.  
To ensure that sailors in both the treatment and control groups had a comparable time 
period to utilize TA, the sample was restricted to sailors who completed at least 36 
months of service.  This restriction reduced the number of observations to 278,474.  
High school graduates comprised the largest education accession group (87.2%); 
females comprised 17% of new recruits, African Americans 19%, Hispanics 11.7%, and 
Asians 5.3%. The overall TA participation rate in the first 4-years of service was 16%.  
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the full sample of individual sailors, and 
separately for TA-users and non-users.   
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Samples of All Recruits and Recruits Who 
Enrolled in TA  
Variable Full Sample TA Users Non-TA Users 
TA Usage rate .159 — — 
TA Completers .130 .820 — 
DL Completers .029 .750 — 
Non-DL Completers .114 .856 — 
Reenlistments & Extensionsa .681 .747 .668 
Reenlistment Rate .379 .351 .383 
Promotion Rate E4 .856 .899 .842 
Promotion Rate E5 .239 .258 .235 
Age .199 .201 .199 
AFQT Score (percentile) .612 .633 .608 
Female .171 .348 .137 
Married .398 .432 .391 
White .599 .556 .608 
African-American .187 .199 .185 
Hispanic .117 .136 .113 
Asian .053 .065 .050 
H.S. Diploma .872 .888 .869 
No H.S. Diploma .054 .040 .057 
GED .030 .025 .031 
Some College .044 .047 .043 
Sample Size 278,474 44,251 234,223 
a Variable includes all sailors who reenlisted or extended past their initial enlistment. 
Of the 44,251 individuals who enrolled in TA during this period, 82% successfully 
completed at least one course. Completion rates were lower for those taking DL classes 
than for those taking traditional classes (.75 vs. .85).  TA participation rates of women 
are more than double those of men (32% vs. 12.4%) 
To adjust for selection bias, the retention and promotion models are estimated for 
the sample of TA users only.  Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for the TA users 
sample and, among all TA users, separately for DL and traditional class-takers.  DL 
users are only 1.1 points less likely to reenlist than those taking traditional classes, but 
are 2.4% more likely to stay beyond 4 years of service.  Women are more likely to enroll 
in DL than men. DL class takers have higher average AFQT scores and are more likely 
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to be married than traditional students.  Minorities participate in traditional TA classes at 
higher rates than DL classes, whereas whites are the only group to prefer DL classes.  
Sailors with some college are more likely to utilize DL than traditional TA. 
Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of TA Users Only 
Variable All TA Users DL Users Traditional Users 
TA Completers .820 .750 .856 
Reenlist & Extensionsa .747 .763 .745 
Reenlist Rateb .351 .315 .353 
Promotion Rate E4 .899 .931 .895 
Promotion Rate E5 .258 .359 .239 
Age .201 .204 .200 
AFQT Score (%) .633 .656 .627 
Female .348 .365 .356 
Married .432 .502 .417 
White .556 .592 .542 
African-American .199 .186 .205 
Hispanic .136 .114 .142 
Asian .065 .051 .068 
H.S. Diploma .888 .882 .889 
No H.S. Diploma .040 .035 .041 
GED .025 .027 .024 
Some College .047 .057 .046 
Sample Size 44,251 10,854 36,928 
a Variable includes all sailors who reenlisted or extended past their initial enlistment 
b To calculate reenlistment rates, the sample was restricted to recruits who entered 1994-2001   and had 
valid ISC codes. 
 
F. DL Participation Models 
The summary statistics above indicate that TA participation varies by 
demographic characteristics and that TA users are different from non-participants.  To 
establish a baseline for participation in the Navy’s TA program, probit models were 
estimated for the determinants of overall TA participation, and separately for the 
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determinants of taking a DL course and for taking a traditional course.  Model (2) was 
used to estimate the TA participation models: 
 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
( 1| )i i i i i
i i i t i
P TA X Female Race Married Dependents
Age AFQT Education FY u
a b b b b
b b b b
= = + + + +
+ + + + +
  (2) 
These models are intended to be descriptive and to reveal whether the observed 




V. Statistical Results 
A. Student Learning Outcomes 
As discussed earlier, the course completion models use course-level data. The 
NETC data on TA-funded courses taken by Sailors between FY 1994 and 2008 
provides a sample size of 1,641,740 person-course observations for undergraduate 
college classes.  These courses were taken by 233,459 different Sailors.  Thus, over 
this period, the average Sailor enrolled in about seven college classes.  We use fixed 
effects to estimate the course completion model to eliminate heterogeneity due to fixed 
individual characteristics such as aptitude, motivation, ability, and initiative.9  The key 
results from the model are summarized in Table 5.  The full results for the course 
completion model are displayed in Appendix Table 1. 
Table 5.  Course Completion Models 
 LPM Regression Model Fixed Effects Model 
DL Course -0.007 -0.065 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Constant 0.835 0.880 
 (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Observations 1,336,878 1,336,878 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 
Individuals  N.A. 217,052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
* significant at .10; **significant at.05; ***significant at .01 
                                            
9 One problem the data cannot address is that of ‘non-starters,’ students who enroll in a class, but never 
start the class.  Howell et al. (2004) argue that a large portion of non-completers are students who never 
attend a class, submit any assignments, or take any tests (non-starters).  Unfortunately, the NETC data 
does not contain any information that would identify non-starters.  In this model a non-completer is a 
sailor who did not withdraw from a course before the official withdrawal date and consequently received 
either a failing or an incomplete grade or a ‘w’ for the withdrawal. 
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In the linear probability model estimated via OLS in column 1, the estimated 
effect of taking a DL class is negative but small in magnitude.  However, we argued 
above that this estimate is likely to be biased due to self-selection into DL classes.  
When the model is estimated via fixed effects in column 2, which nets out individual 
fixed characteristics, we find that the negative effect of taking a DL class is much larger.  
The fixed effect coefficient suggests that if the same sailor switches from a traditional to 
a DL class he is 6.5 percentage points less likely to complete the course. At the mean 
completion rate of .82, this represents about an 8 percent lower pass rate in DL 
courses. The key point here is that these estimates are not dependent on any 
unobserved individual characteristics and have a causal interpretation. 
As the full results in Appendix Table 1 show, among the other determinants, the 
coefficients of the year dummies suggest that TA completion rates have deteriorated 
over time.  The gap in completion rates was 2-3 points in the earliest years covered by 
this data, 1995-1996, but rose to a difference of 8-9 points in the last two years, 2006-
2007.  There are several hypotheses explaining this trend. First, it could be that the 
availability of DL courses has increased the participation rates of marginal sailors who 
would otherwise not enroll in college courses. These sailors could have lower ability 
than the typical TA participant in earlier years, or they could have more demanding work 
schedules. In fact, the decline in completion rates could be a direct effect of increased 
operational tempo associated with GWOT. Since those taking DL courses are more 
likely to be deployed, it could be that the increased work demands are more visible in 
DL pass rates rather than in traditional TA pass rates. Finally, the increase in the 
amount of reimbursement from the Navy may have reduced the initial individual risk of 
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enrolling in a course, thus resulting in higher participation rates from individuals who are 
simply exploring the possibility of further education rather than committing to it. In fact, 
DL courses may carry less risk for the individual since they allow for a more flexible 
schedule, thus attracting individuals who otherwise may be too busy to invest in further 
education. Since all the course performance models control for individual attributes, the 
most likely explanation for the declining completion rates would have to be one that 
depends on policy changes or changes in the time allocation decisions due to changing 
work schedules. 
Of interest is also the observation that there is some variation in the pass rate in 
DL courses across subjects. The coefficients of the interactions terms in Appendix 
Table 1 indicate that pass rates are lower in distance education classes in History and 
English. 
Table 8 displays the key results of estimating the grade point (GPA) models.  The 
full model results are displayed in Appendix Table 2. 
Table 6.  Model of Course Grades (GPA) 
 LPM Regression Model Fixed Effects Model 
 Coefficient Coefficient 
  (standard error)  (standard error) 
DL Course -0.207 -0.260 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
Constant 3.008 2.902 
 (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
Observations 1,173,093 1,173,093 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 
Number of Individuals  N.A. 200,740 
Robust standard errors in parentheses;* significant at .10; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01   
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The estimates in Table 8 suggest that switching to a DL class is associated with 
a lower course grade.  The effect is somewhat larger in the fixed effects estimates, 
which suggest that taking a DL class reduces an individual’s grade by .26 points.  Since 
the average grade in the sample is 3.18, or slightly above a B, taking an online class 
reduces this to a 2.92, or slightly below a B.  Once again, the fiscal year dummies 
suggest that the negative effect of online classes on grades worsens significantly over 
the period covered by this data.  This is consistent with the course completion results 
above, in part because the course completion or pass rate is based partly on the grade 
recorded in the class. 
B.  Results of TA Program Participation Models 
The TA participation models analyze the determinants of TA participation for a 
sample restricted to first-term Sailors with 4-year contracts who survived at least the first 
36 months of service (N=255,749).  This model is estimated on individual-level data for 
first-term Sailors during this period.  The multivariate models attempt to isolate the 
effects of the demographic characteristics of Sailors on their decisions to take at least 
one TA-subsidized class. Table 8 displays the estimated probit coefficients along with 
their standard errors and the calculated marginal effect associated with each coefficient.  
 In column 1 of Table 7 we find that TA participation rates are much higher (15.5 
percentage points higher) for women than for men.   The 15.5 percentage point 
difference means that women are nearly twice as likely to take a TA class as men are.  
Most minority groups, excluding Native Americans, are more likely to participate in TA 
than whites.  Hispanics and Asian-Americans are about 4 percentage points (25%) 
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more likely to participate than whites, while Blacks are about 2 points (12%) more likely 
to participate than whites.  Sailors who were married during their first enlistment were 2 
points more likely to participate, while those with dependents were less likely to 
participate.  Not surprisingly, those with higher AFQT scores are more likely to 
participate, while those with no high school diploma or a GED were less likely to take 
college courses.  The effect of AFQT scores indicates that a 10-point increase in AFQT 
score increases TA usage by about 2 points.  Surprisingly, recruits with some college 
were less likely to participate in TA, as compared to high school diploma graduates.  
However, it should be pointed out that often recruits with ‘some college’ have not 
necessarily received a traditional high school diploma.  Being classified as having ‘some 
college’ increases the educational status of military applicants and increases their 
chances of being accepted into the military. 
In terms of differences in participation by mode of instruction, the results show 
that, consistent with previous studies, sailors with dependents were no less likely to 
participate in DL classes, but were 1.5 points less likely to participate in traditional 
classes. Otherwise, few differences emerge in the likelihood to take DL versus non-DL 
classes.  Finally, as expected, the year dummies reflect the increased annual growth of 
DL classes after FY 2000.  As discussed above, the increase appears to be traced to 
the Navy’s program that signed partnership agreements with postsecondary institutions 
to supply DL classes.  Another reason is that the Navy has increased the availability of 
computers and internet access to Sailors during the past decade.  Finally, the increase 
to 100% tuition reimbursement also played a role.    
 
  52
Table 7.  Probit Model of TA Participation by Course Type 
 Overall TA  DL TA  Traditional TA  
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
       
female 0.588 0.155 0.461 0.032 0.560 0.131 
 (0.008)***  (0.012)***  (0.008)***  
black 0.083 0.019 0.038 0.002 0.100 0.020 
 (0.009)***  (0.014)***  (0.009)***  
native -0.077 -0.016 -0.084 -0.004 -0.064 -0.012 
 (0.019)***  (0.028)***  (0.020)***  
Asian 0.177 0.042 0.038 0.002 0.199 0.042 
 (0.014)***  (0.023)  (0.014)***  
Hispanic 0.188 0.044 0.082 0.004 0.202 0.042 
 (0.010)***  (0.017)***  (0.010)***  
race unknown 0.148 0.035 0.113 0.006 0.184 0.039 
 (0.038)***  (0.048)**  (0.040)***  
race other 0.224 0.055 0.135 0.008 0.229 0.050 
 (0.036)***  (0.052)***  (0.037)***  
married 0.090 0.020 0.103 0.005 0.076 0.015 
 (0.009)***  (0.014)***  (0.009)***  
dependents -0.064 -0.014 -0.010 -0.000 -0.077 -0.015 
 (0.005)***  (0.007)  (0.005)***  
age 0.009 0.002 0.018 0.001 0.006 0.001 
 (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.001)***  
AFQT 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.007 0.001 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
non high school -0.119 -0.024 -0.153 -0.007 -0.107 -0.019 
diploma (0.016)***  (0.026)***  (0.016)***  
GED -0.072 -0.015 -0.100 -0.004 -0.064 -0.012 
 (0.020)***  (0.031)***  (0.021)***  
some college -0.106 -0.022 -0.091 -0.004 -0.085 -0.015 
 (0.016)***  (0.024)***  (0.017)***  
fy95 0.020 0.004 0.408 0.029 0.008 0.001 
 (0.016)  (0.059)***  (0.017)  
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fy96 -0.002 -0.000 0.669 0.058 -0.022 -0.004 
 (0.016)  (0.056)***  (0.017)  
fy97 -0.040 -0.008 0.774 0.072 -0.062 -0.011 
 (0.016)**  (0.055)***  (0.016)***  
fy98 0.047 0.010 0.942 0.099 0.007 0.001 
 (0.016)***  (0.054)***  (0.016)  
fy99 0.024 0.005 1.019 0.112 -0.030 -0.006 
 (0.016)  (0.054)***  (0.016)*  
fy00 0.064 0.014 1.212 0.151 -0.033 -0.006 
 (0.016)***  (0.053)***  (0.016)**  
fy01 0.145 0.034 1.407 0.204 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.016)***  (0.053)***  (0.016)  
fy02 0.227 0.054 1.587 0.251 0.028 0.005 
 (0.015)***  (0.053)***  (0.016)*  
fy03 0.250 0.060 1.665 0.276 0.020 0.004 
 (0.015)***  (0.053)***  (0.016)  
Constant -2.105  -4.251  -1.962  
 (0.030)***  (0.067)***  (0.032)***  
Observations 255,749 255,749 255749 255,749 255,749 255,749 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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C. Retention Models 
The retention models estimate the effects of TA on the retention probability while 
controlling for race, gender, education, AFQT scores, marital status, number of 
dependents, and dummies for year and occupational categories. Without occupational 
controls, differences in external job opportunities and occupational work demands 
coupled with higher selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB) for ratings with historically 
lower retention rates could bias model parameter estimates. 
Three different retention outcomes are examined – long-term reenlistment, short-
term extensions, and reenlistments plus extensions.  The results of the probit retention 
models are listed in Tables 8-10.  Again, the full model results are displayed in 
Appendix Tables 3-5. 
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Table 8.  Probit Reenlistment Models 
 Effect of TA on reenlistment Effect of passing TA class on 
Reenlistment 
Effect of passing DL class on 
Reenlistment 








Ever take TA course  0.729 0.281     
 (0.007)*** (0.003)***     
Pass at least one TA course   0.280 0.110   
   (0.016)*** (0.006)***   
Pass at least one DL course     0.664 0.246 
     (0.012)*** (0.004)*** 
Pass at least one non-DL course     0.045 0.017 
     (0.013)*** (0.005)*** 
Observations 208,488 208,488 63,169 63,169 63,169 63,169 
Standard errors in parentheses;* significant at .010; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01 
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In columns 1-2 of Table 8, when retention is measured as long-term 
reenlistments, the estimates suggest that sailors who take TA classes are more likely to 
reenlist at the end of their enlistment term. Moreover, the marginal effect is quite large, 
suggesting that those who take at least one TA class are more likely to reenlist by 28 
percentage points (a 70 percent difference).  However, when the sample is restricted to 
only those who take TA classes in columns 3-4, the effect of TA indicates a difference of 
only 11 percentage points.  This difference between the two samples is an indicator of 
the size of the selection bias in the estimates in columns 1-2, which are not adjusted for 
sample selectivity.  In columns 5-6 we separate the TA courses into those taken and 
passed via DL and those taken and passed via traditional methods.  Both groups are 
more likely to reenlist, but the marginal effect is much higher for those who pass DL 
classes than those who pass traditional classes (25 points versus 2 points, 
respectively). 
Table 9 presents the results of probit models of extending beyond the EAOS 
date.  Columns 1-2 show that those who ever take a TA class are 6 points less likely to 
extend than those who do not use TA.  In columns 3-4 when we adjust for sample 
selectivity bias, this effect remains negative, but indicates only a 3 point difference in the 
extension probability.  Finally, in columns 5-6, the effect of passing a DL class has a 
much larger effect in terms of reducing extensions than passing a traditional class.   
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 Table 9.   Probit Extension Models 
 Effect of TA on extension Effect of passing TA class on 
extension 
Effect of passing DL class on 
extension 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
 (std. error)  (std. error)  (std. error)  
Sample:   All  TA participants       TA participants  
Ever take TA course  -0.216 -0.067     
 (0.007)*** (0.002)***     
Pass at least one TA course   -0.108 -0.034   
   (0.017)*** (0.005)***   
Pass at least one DL course     -0.346 -0.103 
     (0.013)*** (0.004)*** 
Pass at least one non-DL     -0.001 -0.000 
     (0.013) (0.004) 
Observations 208,463 208,463 63,169 63,169 63,169 63,169 
Standard errors in parentheses; significant at .01; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01 
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Finally, in Table 10, when the model captures both extensions and reenlistments 
the results simply provide the average effects from both the separate reenlistment and 
extension models. Specifically, passing at least one TA course yields a 6.6 points 
increase in the probability of a sailor serving beyond the contract expiration date via 
either an extension or a reenlistment. 
  The results show no differences in retention rates for women, but both 
models find that African-Americans have higher retention rates.  Sailors who are 
married or have dependents are more likely to reenlist or extend their service beyond 
the first four years.  In both models sailors entering with some college have the lowest 
probability of staying. 
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Table 10.  Probit Retention Models (Reenlistments and Extensions). 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at .01; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01    
 Effect of taking TA on Retention Effect of passing TA class on Retention Effect of passing DL class on Retention 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient  Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Sample: All  TA participants  TA participants  
Ever take TA course  0.735 0.221     
 (0.008)*** (0.002)***     
Pass at least one TA course   0.316 0.066   
   (0.019)*** (0.004)***   
Pass at least one DL course     0.733 0.112 
     (0.017)*** (0.002)*** 
Pass at least one non-DL course     0.095 0.016 
     (0.016)*** (0.003)*** 
Observations 208,488 208,488 63,169 63,169 63,169 63,169 
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D. Promotion Models 
Next, we evaluate the effect of TA participation on promotion to E-5.  If additional 
general education increases the productivity of new recruits, we would expect service 
members who participate in TA to be more likely to be promoted, all else equal.  The 
multivariate linear probability promotion models use the same specification as the 
retention models above.  The sample is again restricted to 4-year enlistees who 
completed at least 36 months of service to ensure that all sailors in the sample had 
adequate, and comparable, time to utilize TA.  In contrast to the retention models, the 
promotion models are estimated via fixed effects on the panel dataset including 
observations for sailors in all four years of service. Key parameter estimates of the 
linear probability models and fixed effects models using the panel data set are 
presented in Table 11.  Full model results are presented in Appendix Table 6.  
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Table 11. Promotion to E-5  
 LPM  FE LPM FE LPM FE
Sample: 4-year stayers TA enrollees TA enrollees 
Ever take TA course  0.018 0.006     
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***     
Pass at least one TA course   0.009 0.001   
   (0.002)*** (0.002)   
Pass at least one DL course     0.043 0.035 
     (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
Pass at least one non-DL course     0.004 -0.003 
     (0.002)* (0.002) 
Observations 800,844 800,844 107,260 107,260 107,260 107,260 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Number of individuals N.A. 200,211 N.A. 26,815 N.A. 26,815 
Standard errors in parentheses;* significant at .01; ** significant at .05; *** significant at .01    
 
To provide benchmark estimates, the results in columns 1-2 are estimated using 
the full sample of 4-year stayers.  These results indicate that TA use is associated with 
about a 1 point higher promotion rate to E-5.  The results in cols. 3-4 are based on the 
restricted sample of TA users.  In this setup, the effect of passing at least one TA class 
is also about 1 point in the LPM estimates, but is not significant in the fixed effects 
estimates.  Thus, there appears to be some upward bias in the unadjusted estimates, 
although the overall promotion effect, even when significant appears to be small in 
magnitude.  Interestingly, in columns 5-6 the positive promotion effect appears to be 
confined to those who successfully complete DL classes.  The promotion rate of DL 
completers is 3.5 percentage points higher than non-completers.  Note that the 
comparison group for columns 5-6 is all non-completers. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study provides new evidence on the effects of the Navy’s TA program on the 
first-term retention and performance of new recruits.  Relevant to current policy 
decisions, we investigate whether there are any differences in both course performance 
and performance on the job between sailors who take traditional and those who take DL 
classes.  To overcome selection bias our estimates are based on samples of TA users 
only and on estimation via fixed effects methods. 
Overall, we find that passing a TA course improves reenlistment rates.  The 
reenlistment effect is larger for those who take and pass DL courses than for those who 
pass traditional courses.  On the other hand, those who pass DL courses are less likely 
to extend beyond their EAOS date.  Thus, the TA program acts much like the selective 
reenlistment bonus (SRB) program – it stimulates long-term reenlistment contracts and 
reduces short-term extensions.  The overall effect is to increase the years of effective 
service from TA participants, which allows a longer time for the Navy to recoup firm-
specific training investments.  A monetary benefit of the TA program is the potential cost 
saving from the reduced SRB spending necessary to generate a given reenlistment 
rate.  Of course, it is unknown whether these cost savings would exceed the TA 
program costs that produced the retention effect. 
We also find that TA users are more likely to be promoted to E-5 before the end 
of the first term of service than are non-users.  However, the effect appears to be 
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confined to those who take and pass DL classes.  In our preferred estimates, the 
promotion effect of taking and passing a traditional class is statistically insignificant. 
Because we find that the retention and promotion effects of TA usage are much 
larger for those who successfully complete their courses, our analysis of success rates 
is especially important.  We find that those who enroll in online classes are less likely to 
complete their TA classes (a difference of about 8%).  This effect is larger for those in 
lower pay grades and in certain subjects, especially English, Math, and Sciences.  The 
negative effect is partially reduced when more senior enlistees take DL courses.   It is 
likely that the lower completion rates for DL courses are due to the heavier work 
demands of DL students compared to sailors who take traditional classes.  We control 
for this factor in part by including occupation dummies in the models, but this 
adjustment does not account for classes that may have been chosen due to 
deployments or other situations where service members have higher workloads and 
where traditional courses are unavailable. 
The models clearly indicate positive returns to the TA program in terms of job 
performance, especially for DL students who pass their courses.  These positive 
outcomes should be added to other benefits of the program, such as its effect as a 
recruiting incentive.  Additionally, because females and minorities are more frequent 
users of TA, the program serves as a diversity tool. 
B. Recommendations 
DL use is rapidly growing in both Navy and civilian institutions.  Although this 
study found negative effects of taking for DL classes on course completion rates, the 
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effect is much smaller for more senior enlistees.  This is consistent with civilian studies 
that more successful DL students are more mature and career oriented.  Finally, the 
study finds that retention and promotion effects are much larger for those who 
successfully complete their classes.   
Future policies should focus on combating course failures, drops,  and 
withdrawals.  An obvious policy shift would be to screen students who are applying for 
DL classes, especially junior sailors and those who are taking a DL class for the first 
time. Adjusting to the military environment, to the demands of  required training, and to 
the demands of their first jobs consumes too much time for junior sailors to devote 
sufficient time to do well in online classes. In addition, there is a need for increased 
command awareness of service members who take off-duty courses along with 
counseling programs in Navy College Centers that build strong study habits and that 
stress course completion.  One possibility is to institute a policy of disallowing future 
course enrollments for one semester for students who fail to complete a class and 
require that they receive educational counseling or assessment as to their suitability for 
college classes, especially online classes.  With the unique challenges and 
opportunities provided by service in the Navy, flexible educational opportunities will 
continue to be needed in order to fulfill both training and educational requirements for 
tomorrow’s sailors. 
The following are recommendations for further research.  We recommend a 
follow-on study which focuses on the differential costs of providing online and traditional 
classes, which include the costs of the lower completion rates in DL classes.  
Subsequent studies should also incorporate more recent cohorts to encompass the 
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rapid growth of DL after about 2003 and after expansion of the NCDLP program.  Next, 
it is important to obtain data to augment TA information with data on deployments and 
deployment durations, which will help isolate the effect of DL on passing rates. Finally, 
we recommend further analyses on patterns of course taking to find out whether course 
completion and reenlistment rates vary between sailors who take courses occasionally 
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Appendix Table 1.  Course Completion Models 
 LPM Regression Model Fixed Effects Model Fixed Effects Model (with 
interactions) 
DL Course -0.007 -0.065 -0.066 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.006)*** 
FY1995 -0.012 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY1996 -0.012 -0.038 -0.038 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY1997 -0.012 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY1998 -0.020 -0.043 -0.042 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY1999 -0.038 -0.060 -0.059 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY2000 -0.027 -0.055 -0.054 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
FY2001 -0.035 -0.063 -0.063 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2002 -0.045 -0.059 -0.059 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2003 -0.101 -0.066 -0.065 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2004 -0.123 -0.077 -0.077 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2005 -0.113 -0.079 -0.078 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2006 -0.089 -0.076 -0.075 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
FY2007 -0.091 -0.093 -0.092 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Business  0.079 0.041 0.035 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
History  0.056 0.037 0.043 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Math  0.021 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002)*** (0.002) (0.002) 
Natural Sciences  0.047 0.032 0.032 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Physical Sciences -0.042 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.000) 
IT  0.083 0.053 0.050 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Humanities  0.075 0.053 0.051 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
English  0.069 0.047 0.049 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Misc  0.000 0.040 0.035 
 (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Medical  0.091 0.059 0.056 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Vocational  0.113 0.060 0.058 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
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Law/Crim.Justice 0.117 0.073 0.075 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Paygrade E4 -0.011 0.004 0.004 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)* (0.002)* 
Paygrade E5 0.016 0.010 0.010 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Paygrade E7 0.082 0.031 0.031 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Paygrade E8 0.097 0.049 0.048 
 (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Paygrade E9 0.099 0.070 0.069 
 (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
DL x Business   0.020 
   (0.006)*** 
DL x History   -0.030 
   (0.006)*** 
DL x Math   -0.007 
   (0.006) 
DL x Nat Sci   -0.003 
   (0.006) 
DL x Phy Sci   -0.011 
   (0.008) 
DL x IT   0.008 
   (0.006) 
DL x Human   0.006 
   (0.006) 
DL x English   -0.016 
   (0.006)*** 
DL x Misc   0.018 
   (0.007)*** 
DL x Medical   0.010 
   (0.007) 
DL x Voc    0.000 
   (0.000) 
DL x Law    -0.011 
    
Constant 0.835 0.880 0.881 
 (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Observations 1336878 1,336,878 1,336,879 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Individuals  N.A. 217,052 217,052 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  




Appendix Table 2.  GPA Models  
 LPM Regression Model Fixed Effects Model 
DL Course -0.207 -0.260 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** 
FY 1995 0.072 -0.039 
 (0.012)*** (0.013)*** 
FY 1996 0.068 -0.046 
 (0.012)*** (0.014)*** 
FY 1997 0.087 -0.010 
 (0.012)*** (0.014) 
FY 1998 0.105 0.020 
 (0.012)*** (0.014) 
FY 1999 0.103 0.039 
 (0.012)*** (0.014)*** 
FY 2000 0.109 0.100 
 (0.012)*** (0.015)*** 
FY 2001 0.111 0.134 
 (0.012)*** (0.015)*** 
FY 2002 0.096 0.157 
 (0.012)*** (0.015)*** 
FY 2003 0.047 0.202 
 (0.012)*** (0.015)*** 
FY 2004 0.082 0.235 
 (0.012)*** (0.015)*** 
FY 2005 0.093 0.243 
 (0.012)*** (0.016)*** 
FY 2006 0.100 0.293 
 (0.012)*** (0.016)*** 
FY 2007 0.078 0.272 
 (0.012)*** (0.016)*** 
Business  0.132 0.193 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
History  -0.030 0.125 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Math  -0.144 -0.054 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Natural Sciences  -0.053 0.081 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Physical Sciences  0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
IT  0.199 0.274 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
Humanities  0.071 0.222 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** 
English  0.030 0.182 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Misc  0.233 0.260 
 (0.008)*** (0.009)*** 
Medical  0.153 0.256 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Vocational  0.227 0.275 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Law/Criminal Justice 0.177 0.308 
 (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
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Paygrade E4 -0.100 0.039 
 (0.003)*** (0.006)*** 
Paygrade E5 0.048 0.062 
 (0.002)*** (0.005)*** 
Paygrade E7 0.298 -0.028 
 (0.003)*** (0.008)*** 
Paygrade E8 0.388 -0.060 
 (0.004)*** (0.013)*** 
Paygrade E9 0.438 -0.102 
 (0.007)*** (0.026)*** 
Constant 3.008 2.902 
 (0.013)*** (0.015)*** 
Observations 1,173,093 1,173,093 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 
Number of Individuals  N.A. 200,740 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   





Appendix Table 3.  Reenlistment Model 
 Effect of taking TA on extension Effect of passing TA class on Extension Effect of passing DL class on 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal 
Sample: All  TA participants TA participants 
Ever take TA course  0.729 0.281     
 (0.007)*** (0.003)***     
Pass at least one TA    0.280 0.110   
course   (0.016)*** (0.006)***   
Pass at least one DL      0.664 0.246 
course     (0.012)*** (0.004)*** 
Pass at least one      0.045 0.017 
non-DL course     (0.013)*** (0.005)*** 
Female  -0.239 -0.089 -0.255 -0.100 -0.278 -0.108 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.013)*** (0.005)*** 
Black 0.246 0.096 0.214 0.081 0.225 0.085 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.015)*** (0.006)*** 
Native American 0.049 0.019 0.115 0.044 0.116 0.044 
 (0.018)*** (0.007)*** (0.034)*** (0.013)*** (0.035)*** (0.013)*** 
Asian 0.255 0.100 0.213 0.080 0.231 0.086 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.023)*** (0.008)*** 
Hispanic 0.032 0.012 0.016 0.006 0.042 0.016 
 (0.009)*** (0.004)*** (0.016) (0.006) (0.017)** (0.006)** 
Unknown -0.050 -0.019 -0.107 -0.042 -0.079 -0.031 
 (0.054) (0.020) (0.097) (0.038) (0.097) (0.038) 
Other 0.067 0.026 -0.086 -0.033 -0.052 -0.020 
 (0.041) (0.016) (0.067) (0.026) (0.068) (0.027) 
Married 0.028 0.011 0.010 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Number of 0.150 0.057 0.154 0.059 0.136 0.052 
 (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** 
age 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)** 
AFQT score -0.003 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-Grad 0.052 0.020 0.011 0.004 0.026 0.010 
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 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.026) (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) 
G.E.D. -0.004 -0.002 0.040 0.015 0.054 0.021 
 (0.018) (0.007) (0.036) (0.014) (0.036) (0.014) 
Some college -0.053 -0.020 -0.082 -0.032 -0.079 -0.031 
 (0.022)** (0.008)** (0.040)** (0.016)** (0.041)* (0.016)* 
A.A.degree -0.078 -0.029 -0.121 -0.048 -0.114 -0.045 
 (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.043)*** (0.017)*** (0.044)*** (0.017)*** 
Undesignated -0.828 -0.254 -0.661 -0.258 -0.663 -0.259 
 (0.060)*** (0.013)*** (0.148)*** (0.054)*** (0.151)*** (0.055)*** 
Special Operations 0.467 0.184 0.153 0.058 0.133 0.050 
 (0.059)*** (0.023)*** (0.104) (0.038) (0.106) (0.039) 
Instructor -0.043 -0.016 0.174 0.066 0.202 0.075 
 (0.078) (0.029) (0.145) (0.053) (0.147) (0.053) 
Combat Systems -0.045 -0.017 -0.169 -0.067 -0.167 -0.066 
 (0.029) (0.011) (0.064)*** (0.025)*** (0.065)** (0.026)** 
Aviation -0.009 -0.003 -0.157 -0.062 -0.124 -0.048 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.029)*** (0.011)*** (0.029)*** (0.012)*** 
Seaman 0.023 0.009 0.007 0.003 0.019 0.007 
 (0.017) (0.006) (0.038) (0.015) (0.038) (0.015) 
Security -0.432 -0.150 -0.907 -0.343 -0.906 -0.344 
 (0.059)*** (0.018)*** (0.087)*** (0.028)*** (0.089)*** (0.029)*** 
Communications 0.151 0.059 -0.027 -0.011 -0.035 -0.013 
 (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.033) (0.013) (0.034) (0.013) 
Damage Control 0.376 0.148 0.222 0.083 0.181 0.068 
 (0.026)*** (0.010)*** (0.051)*** (0.018)*** (0.052)*** (0.019)*** 
Missile Tech 0.190 0.074 0.071 0.027 0.051 0.020 
 (0.022)*** (0.009)*** (0.043)* (0.016)* (0.044) (0.017) 
Sonar Tech 0.325 0.128 0.194 0.073 0.151 0.057 
 (0.020)*** (0.008)*** (0.042)*** (0.015)*** (0.043)*** (0.016)*** 
Information Tech -0.033 -0.013 -0.192 -0.075 -0.222 -0.087 
 (0.017)* (0.007)* (0.034)*** (0.013)*** (0.034)*** (0.014)*** 
Radar Tech 0.112 0.043 -0.026 -0.010 -0.058 -0.023 
 (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.031) (0.012) (0.032)* (0.012)* 
Intelligence 0.038 0.015 -0.074 -0.029 -0.112 -0.044 
 (0.035) (0.013) (0.056) (0.022) (0.057)** (0.022)* 
Ops Specialist 0.003 0.001 -0.166 -0.065 -0.195 -0.077 
 (0.040) (0.015) (0.061)*** (0.024)*** (0.063)*** (0.025)*** 
Medical -0.195 -0.072 -0.510 -0.201 -0.473 -0.186 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.029)*** (0.011)*** (0.029)*** (0.011)*** 
Photography -0.002 -0.001 -0.042 -0.016 0.023 0.009 
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 (0.096) (0.037) (0.164) (0.064) (0.168) (0.065) 
Meteorology -0.095 -0.036 -0.334 -0.132 -0.393 -0.155 
 (0.041)** (0.015)** (0.061)*** (0.024)*** (0.063)*** (0.025)*** 
Musician 0.356 0.140 -0.342 -0.135 -0.283 -0.112 
 (0.073)*** (0.029)*** (0.139)** (0.055)** (0.141)** (0.056)** 
Admin Clerk 0.171 0.067 -0.019 -0.007 -0.023 -0.009 
 (0.017)*** (0.007)*** (0.032) (0.013) (0.033) (0.013) 
Supply Clerk 0.134 0.052 0.054 0.021 0.070 0.027 
 (0.018)*** (0.007)*** (0.036) (0.014) (0.037)* (0.014)* 
Postal Clerk -0.064 -0.024 -0.139 -0.055 -0.166 -0.065 
 (0.052) (0.020) (0.089) (0.035) (0.092)* (0.036)* 
Rel Specialist -0.043 -0.016 -0.320 -0.127 -0.316 -0.125 
 (0.058) (0.022) (0.078)*** (0.031)*** (0.079)*** (0.032)*** 
Engineer 0.156 0.061 -0.188 -0.074 -0.168 -0.066 
 (0.021)*** (0.008)*** (0.043)*** (0.017)*** (0.044)*** (0.017)*** 
Int. Comms. -0.205 -0.075 -0.128 -0.050 -0.162 -0.063 
 (0.034)*** (0.012)*** (0.074)* (0.029)* (0.075)** (0.030)** 
Ordinance 0.087 0.033 -0.068 -0.027 -0.025 -0.010 
 (0.023)*** (0.009)*** (0.052) (0.020) (0.053) (0.020) 
Machinist Mate -0.178 -0.066 -0.129 -0.051 -0.139 -0.054 
 (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.048)*** (0.019)*** (0.049)*** (0.019)*** 
Nuclear 0.788 0.306 0.552 0.194 0.538 0.188 
 (0.017)*** (0.006)*** (0.036)*** (0.011)*** (0.036)*** (0.011)*** 
Machinery Repair 0.001 0.001 0.051 0.020 0.090 0.034 
 (0.036) (0.014) (0.080) (0.030) (0.081) (0.030) 
Parachute Rig. -0.144 -0.054 -0.084 -0.033 -0.081 -0.032 
 (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.056) (0.022) (0.057) (0.022) 
Electricn Mate 0.001 0.000 -0.253 -0.100 -0.235 -0.093 
 (0.051) (0.020) (0.083)*** (0.033)*** (0.085)*** (0.034)*** 
Culinary Spec. 0.184 0.072 0.082 0.031 0.110 0.042 
 (0.021)*** (0.008)*** (0.047)* (0.018)* (0.048)** (0.018)** 
Ship Servicemen 0.024 0.009 0.162 0.061 0.189 0.071 
 (0.047) (0.018) (0.108) (0.040) (0.111)* (0.040)* 
Master at Arms -0.064 -0.024 -0.194 -0.076 -0.245 -0.097 
 (0.038)* (0.014)* (0.060)*** (0.024)*** (0.061)*** (0.024)*** 
1995 Cohort 0.035 0.013 0.030 0.012 0.009 0.004 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.024) (0.009) (0.024) (0.009) 
1996 Cohort 0.200 0.078 0.139 0.053 0.105 0.040 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.023)*** (0.009)*** (0.023)*** (0.009)*** 
1997 Cohort 0.321 0.126 0.293 0.109 0.246 0.092 
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 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.024)*** (0.009)*** 
1998 Cohort 0.338 0.132 0.190 0.072 0.117 0.045 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.023)*** (0.009)*** 
1999 Cohort 0.225 0.088 0.051 0.020 -0.036 -0.014 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.022)** (0.008)** (0.022) (0.009) 
2000 Cohort 0.019 0.007 -0.184 -0.072 -0.289 -0.113 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.022)*** (0.009)*** (0.023)*** (0.009)*** 
2001 Cohort -0.207 -0.077 -0.554 -0.218 -0.660 -0.259 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.024)*** (0.009)*** (0.025)*** (0.009)*** 
2002 Cohort -1.164 -0.329 -1.617 -0.527 -1.743 -0.551 
 (0.020)*** (0.003)*** (0.039)*** (0.007)*** (0.039)*** (0.006)*** 
2003 Cohort -1.321 -0.341 -1.776 -0.541 -1.932 -0.564 
 (0.062)*** (0.008)*** (0.118)*** (0.016)*** (0.119)*** (0.013)*** 
2004 Cohort 0.892 0.341     
 (0.272)*** (0.091)***     
Constant -0.941  0.336  0.418  
 (0.032)***  (0.062)***  (0.063)***  
Observations 208,488 208,488 63,169 63,169 63,169 63,169 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
  77
Appendix Table 4.   Probit Model of Extension Probability 
 Effect of TA on extension Effect of passing TA class on Extension Effect of passing DL class on extension 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Ever take TA course  -0.216 -0.067     
 (0.007)*** (0.002)***     
Pass at least one TA    -0.108 -0.034   
course   (0.017)*** (0.005)***   
Pass at least one DL      -0.346 -0.103 
course     (0.013)*** (0.004)*** 
Pass at least one      -0.001 -0.000 
non-DL course     (0.013) (0.004) 
Female  0.167 0.055 0.176 0.056 0.185 0.059 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)*** (0.004)*** 
Black -0.062 -0.020 -0.089 -0.027 -0.093 -0.028 
 (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.016)*** (0.005)*** (0.016)*** (0.005)*** 
Native American -0.018 -0.006 -0.084 -0.026 -0.083 -0.025 
 (0.018) (0.006) (0.035)** (0.010)** (0.036)** (0.010)** 
Asian -0.105 -0.033 -0.139 -0.041 -0.145 -0.043 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)*** (0.007)*** (0.024)*** (0.007)*** 
Hispanic -0.023 -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.019 -0.006 
 (0.010)** (0.003)** (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) 
Race Unknown -0.011 -0.003 0.034 0.011 0.020 0.006 
 (0.052) (0.017) (0.097) (0.031) (0.097) (0.030) 
Race Other -0.012 -0.004 -0.019 -0.006 -0.039 -0.012 
 (0.045) (0.014) (0.074) (0.023) (0.074) (0.022) 
Marriage status at end 0.014 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.002 
 (0.008)* (0.003)* (0.014) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
Number of dependents  -0.084 -0.027 -0.124 -0.038 -0.113 -0.035 
 (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.003)*** 
age 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.001 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)* (0.001)* (0.002) (0.001) 
AFQT score 0.008 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.002 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non Grad -0.004 -0.001 0.036 0.011 0.026 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.004) (0.028) (0.009) (0.028) (0.009) 
G.E.D. 0.076 0.025 0.014 0.004 0.007 0.002 
 (0.019)*** (0.006)*** (0.038) (0.012) (0.038) (0.012) 
Some college 0.045 0.015 0.051 0.016 0.049 0.015 
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 (0.023)** (0.008)* (0.042) (0.014) (0.042) (0.014) 
A.A. 0.023 0.007 0.076 0.024 0.072 0.023 
 (0.022) (0.007) (0.044)* (0.015)* (0.045) (0.014) 
Undesignated -0.097 -0.030 -0.093 -0.028 -0.101 -0.030 
 (0.050)* (0.015)** (0.145) (0.042) (0.145) (0.041) 
Special Operations 0.136 0.045 -0.039 -0.012 -0.023 -0.007 
 (0.062)** (0.022)** (0.112) (0.034) (0.113) (0.034) 
Instructor 0.574 0.211 0.154 0.050 0.144 0.047 
 (0.074)*** (0.029)*** (0.147) (0.050) (0.147) (0.050) 
Combat Systems -0.098 -0.030 -0.010 -0.003 -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.031)*** (0.009)*** (0.071) (0.022) (0.071) (0.022) 
Aviation 0.042 0.014 0.003 0.001 -0.016 -0.005 
 (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.032) (0.010) (0.032) (0.010) 
Seaman -0.059 -0.019 -0.100 -0.030 -0.105 -0.031 
 (0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.042)** (0.012)** (0.042)** (0.012)*** 
Security 0.553 0.203 0.534 0.192 0.521 0.186 
 (0.056)*** (0.022)*** (0.085)*** (0.033)*** (0.086)*** (0.033)*** 
Communications 0.301 0.104 0.138 0.045 0.144 0.046 
 (0.017)*** (0.006)*** (0.036)*** (0.012)*** (0.036)*** (0.012)*** 
Damage Control 0.486 0.176 0.121 0.039 0.150 0.049 
 (0.025)*** (0.010)*** (0.053)** (0.018)** (0.053)*** (0.018)*** 
Missile Tech 0.385 0.136 0.148 0.048 0.163 0.053 
 (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.046)*** (0.016)*** (0.046)*** (0.016)*** 
Sonar Tech 0.193 0.065 0.021 0.006 0.050 0.016 
 (0.021)*** (0.007)*** (0.045) (0.014) (0.045) (0.014) 
Info. Tech 0.126 0.042 0.080 0.026 0.095 0.030 
 (0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.037)** (0.012)** (0.037)*** (0.012)** 
Radar Tech 0.099 0.033 0.036 0.011 0.055 0.017 
 (0.016)*** (0.005)*** (0.034) (0.011) (0.034) (0.011) 
Intelligence -0.125 -0.039 -0.130 -0.039 -0.108 -0.032 
 (0.038)*** (0.011)*** (0.062)** (0.018)** (0.062)* (0.018)* 
Ops. Spec -0.008 -0.002 -0.076 -0.023 -0.067 -0.020 
 (0.044) (0.014) (0.069) (0.020) (0.070) (0.021) 
Medical 1.014 0.378 0.889 0.319 0.870 0.311 
 (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.031)*** (0.012)*** (0.031)*** (0.012)*** 
Photography -0.296 -0.085 -0.352 -0.095 -0.387 -0.102 
 (0.110)*** (0.028)*** (0.205)* (0.047)** (0.206)* (0.045)** 
Meteorology 0.084 0.028 0.135 0.044 0.159 0.052 
 (0.043)** (0.015)* (0.066)** (0.022)** (0.066)** (0.023)** 
Musician -0.018 -0.006 0.313 0.107 0.277 0.093 
  79
 (0.078) (0.025) (0.141)** (0.052)** (0.142)* (0.051)* 
Admin. clerk 0.011 0.003 -0.047 -0.015 -0.046 -0.014 
 (0.019) (0.006) (0.035) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011) 
Supply Clerk -0.081 -0.025 -0.160 -0.047 -0.168 -0.049 
 (0.020)*** (0.006)*** (0.041)*** (0.011)*** (0.041)*** (0.011)*** 
Postal Clerk 0.006 0.002 -0.153 -0.045 -0.148 -0.043 
 (0.057) (0.018) (0.104) (0.029) (0.104) (0.029) 
Rel. Specialist 0.159 0.053 0.177 0.058 0.172 0.056 
 (0.062)** (0.022)** (0.083)** (0.029)** (0.083)** (0.029)* 
Engineer 0.762 0.284 0.517 0.184 0.507 0.180 
 (0.021)*** (0.008)*** (0.044)*** (0.017)*** (0.044)*** (0.017)*** 
Int. Comms 0.044 0.014 0.052 0.016 0.070 0.022 
 (0.034) (0.011) (0.079) (0.026) (0.080) (0.026) 
Ordinance -0.145 -0.044 -0.169 -0.049 -0.197 -0.056 
 (0.025)*** (0.007)*** (0.059)*** (0.016)*** (0.060)*** (0.016)*** 
Machinist Mate 0.061 0.020 -0.059 -0.018 -0.056 -0.017 
 (0.023)*** (0.008)*** (0.054) (0.016) (0.054) (0.016) 
Nuclear 0.235 0.080 -0.083 -0.025 -0.067 -0.020 
 (0.017)*** (0.006)*** (0.037)** (0.011)** (0.038)* (0.011)* 
Machinery Repair 0.126 0.042 -0.067 -0.020 -0.086 -0.026 
 (0.037)*** (0.013)*** (0.088) (0.026) (0.089) (0.026) 
Parachute Rig. -0.042 -0.013 -0.094 -0.028 -0.093 -0.028 
 (0.024)* (0.008)* (0.064) (0.018) (0.064) (0.018) 
Electric. Mate 0.867 0.327 0.614 0.223 0.607 0.220 
 (0.050)*** (0.019)*** (0.083)*** (0.033)*** (0.084)*** (0.033)*** 
Culinary Spec. 0.100 0.033 -0.104 -0.031 -0.121 -0.036 
 (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.052)** (0.015)** (0.053)** (0.015)** 
Ship Servicemen 0.053 0.017 -0.157 -0.046 -0.168 -0.049 
 (0.051) (0.017) (0.122) (0.034) (0.123) (0.033) 
Master at Arms 0.434 0.156 0.188 0.062 0.210 0.069 
 (0.033)*** (0.013)*** (0.056)*** (0.020)*** (0.056)*** (0.020)*** 
1995 Cohort -0.077 -0.024 -0.085 -0.026 -0.073 -0.022 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)*** (0.007)*** (0.026)*** (0.008)*** 
1996 Cohort -0.156 -0.048 -0.150 -0.045 -0.129 -0.038 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)*** (0.007)*** (0.025)*** (0.007)*** 
1997 Cohort -0.238 -0.072 -0.251 -0.073 -0.223 -0.065 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.025)*** (0.007)*** (0.025)*** (0.007)*** 
1998 Cohort -0.116 -0.036 -0.120 -0.036 -0.078 -0.024 
 (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)*** (0.007)*** (0.024)*** (0.007)*** 
1999 Cohort -0.032 -0.010 0.026 0.008 0.074 0.023 
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 (0.013)** (0.004)** (0.023) (0.007) (0.024)*** (0.008)*** 
2000 Cohort 0.068 0.022 0.155 0.050 0.211 0.069 
 (0.013)*** (0.004)*** (0.024)*** (0.008)*** (0.024)*** (0.008)*** 
2001 Cohort 0.189 0.063 0.362 0.123 0.414 0.142 
 (0.013)*** (0.005)*** (0.025)*** (0.009)*** (0.026)*** (0.009)*** 
2002 Cohort 0.322 0.112 0.633 0.229 0.686 0.248 
 (0.015)*** (0.006)*** (0.031)*** (0.012)*** (0.031)*** (0.012)*** 
2003 Cohort -1.258 -0.237 -1.125 -0.211 -1.067 -0.204 
 (0.062)*** (0.005)*** (0.126)*** (0.010)*** (0.126)*** (0.011)*** 
Constant -1.325  -1.248  -1.283  
 (0.034)***  (0.066)***  (0.066)***  
Observations 208463 208463 63169 63169 63169 63169 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
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Appendix Table 5.  MODEL OF RETENTION (REENLISTMENT PLUS EXTENSION). 
 Effect of taking TA on extension Effect of passing TA class on Extension Effect of passing DL class on extension 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Ever take TA course  0.735 0.221     
 (0.008)*** (0.002)***     
Pass at least one TA    0.316 0.066   
course   (0.019)*** (0.004)***   
Pass at least one DL      0.733 0.112 
course     (0.017)*** (0.002)*** 
Pass at least one      0.095 0.016 
non-DL course     (0.016)*** (0.003)*** 
Female -0.126 -0.043 -0.185 -0.035 -0.211 -0.038 
 (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.015)*** (0.003)*** (0.016)*** (0.003)*** 
Black 0.216 0.069 0.240 0.040 0.249 0.038 
 (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.020)*** (0.003)*** (0.020)*** (0.003)*** 
Native American 0.041 0.013 0.075 0.013 0.080 0.013 
 (0.019)** (0.006)** (0.043)* (0.007)* (0.044)* (0.007)* 
Asian 0.213 0.067 0.192 0.031 0.208 0.031 
 (0.015)*** (0.004)*** (0.030)*** (0.004)*** (0.031)*** (0.004)*** 
Hispanic 0.011 0.004 0.021 0.004 0.046 0.008 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.020) (0.004) (0.021)** (0.003)** 
Race Unknown -0.063 -0.021 -0.105 -0.020 -0.094 -0.017 
 (0.053) (0.018) (0.106) (0.022) (0.108) (0.020) 
Race Other 0.051 0.017 -0.189 -0.038 -0.161 -0.030 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.083)** (0.019)** (0.085)* (0.017)* 
Married  0.031 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.015 -0.003 
 (0.009)*** (0.003)*** (0.018) (0.003) (0.018) (0.003) 
# of dependents  0.102 0.034 0.096 0.017 0.078 0.013 
 (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.010)*** (0.002)*** (0.011)*** (0.002)*** 
age 0.028 0.009 0.014 0.002 0.015 0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** 
AFQT 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
Non Grad 0.040 0.013 0.058 0.010 0.073 0.012 
 (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.033)* (0.006)* (0.034)** (0.005)** 
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G.E.D. 0.049 0.016 0.075 0.013 0.094 0.015 
 (0.019)** (0.006)*** (0.045)* (0.007)* (0.046)** (0.007)** 
Some college -0.028 -0.009 -0.089 -0.017 -0.090 -0.016 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.049)* (0.010)* (0.050)* (0.009)* 
A.A. -0.069 -0.023 -0.102 -0.020 -0.102 -0.018 
 (0.024)*** (0.008)*** (0.056)* (0.011)* (0.057)* (0.011)* 
undesignated -0.635 -0.240 -0.725 -0.193 -0.726 -0.183 
 (0.046)*** (0.018)*** (0.136)*** (0.047)*** (0.140)*** (0.047)*** 
Special Operations 0.652 0.170 0.182 0.029 0.168 0.025 
 (0.071)*** (0.013)*** (0.136) (0.019) (0.140) (0.019) 
Instructor 0.545 0.149 0.610 0.074 0.679 0.071 
 (0.084)*** (0.018)*** (0.225)*** (0.016)*** (0.233)*** (0.013)*** 
Combat Systems -0.124 -0.043 -0.260 -0.055 -0.251 -0.049 
 (0.027)*** (0.010)*** (0.071)*** (0.017)*** (0.073)*** (0.016)*** 
Aviation 0.015 0.005 -0.221 -0.044 -0.191 -0.035 
 (0.012) (0.004) (0.034)*** (0.007)*** (0.034)*** (0.007)*** 
Seaman -0.025 -0.008 -0.102 -0.020 -0.091 -0.016 
 (0.016) (0.005) (0.044)** (0.009)** (0.045)** (0.008)* 
Security -0.011 -0.004 -0.597 -0.150 -0.590 -0.139 
 (0.057) (0.019) (0.087)*** (0.028)*** (0.089)*** (0.027)*** 
Communications 0.443 0.129 0.144 0.024 0.145 0.022 
 (0.018)*** (0.004)*** (0.041)*** (0.006)*** (0.042)*** (0.006)*** 
Damage Control 1.208 0.245 0.899 0.091 0.887 0.082 
 (0.037)*** (0.003)*** (0.096)*** (0.004)*** (0.099)*** (0.004)*** 
Missile Tech 0.604 0.163 0.385 0.055 0.381 0.050 
 (0.024)*** (0.005)*** (0.059)*** (0.006)*** (0.061)*** (0.006)*** 
Sonar Tech 0.515 0.144 0.374 0.054 0.337 0.045 
 (0.022)*** (0.005)*** (0.056)*** (0.006)*** (0.057)*** (0.006)*** 
Info. Tech 0.031 0.010 -0.206 -0.042 -0.233 -0.045 
 (0.017)* (0.006)* (0.039)*** (0.009)*** (0.040)*** (0.009)*** 
Radar Tech 0.171 0.055 -0.006 -0.001 -0.037 -0.006 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.037) (0.007) (0.038) (0.007) 
Intelligence -0.122 -0.042 -0.267 -0.057 -0.308 -0.062 
 (0.034)*** (0.012)*** (0.062)*** (0.015)*** (0.064)*** (0.015)*** 
Ops. Specialist -0.063 -0.022 -0.328 -0.072 -0.369 -0.077 
 (0.040) (0.014) (0.068)*** (0.018)*** (0.070)*** (0.018)*** 
Medical 1.242 0.270 0.908 0.110 0.978 0.105 
 (0.019)*** (0.002)*** (0.041)*** (0.003)*** (0.041)*** (0.003)*** 
Photography -0.237 -0.084 -0.419 -0.097 -0.361 -0.075 
 (0.092)** (0.035)** (0.175)** (0.049)** (0.180)** (0.045)* 
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Meteorology -0.092 -0.032 -0.333 -0.073 -0.391 -0.083 
 (0.041)** (0.014)** (0.068)*** (0.018)*** (0.070)*** (0.018)*** 
Musician 0.315 0.094 -0.133 -0.026 -0.072 -0.013 
 (0.080)*** (0.021)*** (0.158) (0.034) (0.161) (0.030) 
Admin. Clerk 0.140 0.045 -0.097 -0.019 -0.105 -0.019 
 (0.018)*** (0.005)*** (0.038)*** (0.008)** (0.039)*** (0.007)** 
Supply Clerk 0.049 0.016 -0.103 -0.020 -0.088 -0.016 
 (0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.042)** (0.009)** (0.043)** (0.008)* 
Postal Clerk -0.082 -0.028 -0.346 -0.077 -0.368 -0.077 
 (0.051) (0.018) (0.096)*** (0.025)*** (0.099)*** (0.025)*** 
Rel. Spec. 0.015 0.005 -0.258 -0.055 -0.247 -0.048 
 (0.060) (0.020) (0.087)*** (0.021)*** (0.089)*** (0.020)** 
SeaBee Engineer 1.110 0.239 0.600 0.074 0.646 0.071 
 (0.026)*** (0.003)*** (0.063)*** (0.005)*** (0.064)*** (0.004)*** 
Int.Comms. -0.159 -0.055 -0.137 -0.027 -0.171 -0.032 
 (0.032)*** (0.012)*** (0.084) (0.018) (0.086)** (0.018)* 
Ordinance -0.019 -0.006 -0.261 -0.055 -0.224 -0.043 
 (0.022) (0.007) (0.057)*** (0.014)*** (0.058)*** (0.013)*** 
Machinist Mate -0.124 -0.043 -0.258 -0.054 -0.271 -0.054 
 (0.021)*** (0.007)*** (0.054)*** (0.013)*** (0.056)*** (0.013)*** 
Nuclear 1.591 0.292 1.388 0.116 1.425 0.105 
 (0.025)*** (0.002)*** (0.069)*** (0.002)*** (0.070)*** (0.002)*** 
Machinery Repair 0.100 0.032 -0.025 -0.005 0.014 0.002 
 (0.035)*** (0.011)*** (0.093) (0.017) (0.095) (0.016) 
Parachute Rig. -0.151 -0.053 -0.224 -0.046 -0.221 -0.043 
 (0.022)*** (0.008)*** (0.063)*** (0.015)*** (0.064)*** (0.014)*** 
Electrician's Mate 1.180 0.239 0.862 0.088 0.904 0.081 
 (0.075)*** (0.006)*** (0.169)*** (0.007)*** (0.172)*** (0.006)*** 
Culinary Spec. 0.260 0.080 -0.002 -0.000 0.027 0.004 
 (0.021)*** (0.006)*** (0.055) (0.010) (0.056) (0.009) 
Ship Servicemen 0.057 0.019 0.069 0.012 0.108 0.017 
 (0.047) (0.015) (0.128) (0.021) (0.132) (0.019) 
Master at Arms 0.371 0.109 0.063 0.011 0.021 0.003 
 (0.034)*** (0.008)*** (0.060) (0.010) (0.062) (0.010) 
1995 Cohort -0.035 -0.012 -0.075 -0.014 -0.095 -0.017 
 (0.015)** (0.005)** (0.031)** (0.006)** (0.032)*** (0.006)*** 
1996 Cohort 0.080 0.026 0.032 0.006 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.031) (0.005) (0.032) (0.005) 
1997 Cohort 0.167 0.053 0.198 0.033 0.150 0.023 
 (0.015)*** (0.005)*** (0.033)*** (0.005)*** (0.034)*** (0.005)*** 
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1998 Cohort 0.305 0.094 0.191 0.032 0.122 0.019 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.031)*** (0.005)*** (0.031)*** (0.005)*** 
1999 Cohort 0.244 0.077 0.148 0.025 0.066 0.011 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.030)*** (0.005)*** (0.031)** (0.005)** 
2000 Cohort 0.090 0.029 -0.096 -0.018 -0.193 -0.035 
 (0.014)*** (0.004)*** (0.029)*** (0.006)*** (0.030)*** (0.006)*** 
2001 Cohort -0.038 -0.013 -0.389 -0.085 -0.492 -0.106 
 (0.014)*** (0.005)*** (0.030)*** (0.008)*** (0.031)*** (0.008)*** 
2002 Cohort -0.534 -0.198 -0.990 -0.282 -1.112 -0.314 
 (0.016)*** (0.006)*** (0.035)*** (0.013)*** (0.036)*** (0.013)*** 
2003 Cohort -1.889 -0.635 -2.402 -0.768 -2.590 -0.804 
 (0.060)*** (0.011)*** (0.125)*** (0.027)*** (0.127)*** (0.024)*** 
2004 Cohort 0.035 0.012     
 (0.279) (0.091)     
Constant -1.001  0.398  0.480  
 (0.035)***  (0.079)***  (0.081)***  
Observations 208488 208488 63169 63169 63169 63169 
Standard errors in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Appendix Table 6.  E5 Promotion Models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable LPM FE LPM FE LPM FE LPM FE 
Black -0.009 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.008 0.000 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) 
Native American -0.002 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Asian -0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)** (0.000) (0.002)* (0.000) (0.002)* (0.000) 
Other -0.006 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.013 0.000 -0.013 0.000 
 (0.003)** (0.000) (0.007)* (0.000) (0.007)* (0.000) (0.007)* (0.000) 
Unknown -0.007 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 -0.011 0.000 
 (0.004)* (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Hispanic -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.002)*** (0.000) 
female  -0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.001)*** (0.000) 
Married  -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Number of dependents  0.004 -0.008 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Married x dependents 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.003)** 
fy2 -0.000 0.021 0.000 0.026 0.003 0.028 0.001 0.026 
 (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)*** 
fy3 0.041 0.071 0.046 0.078 0.050 0.080 0.045 0.077 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
fy4 0.137 0.169 0.149 0.183 0.153 0.185 0.147 0.181 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Special Ops 0.019 -0.088 0.020 -0.108 0.020 -0.108 0.020 -0.107 
 (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.017) (0.025)*** (0.017) (0.025)*** (0.017) (0.025)*** 
Instructor 0.074 0.049 0.096 0.045 0.097 0.045 0.096 0.046 
 (0.013)*** (0.019)*** (0.038)** (0.060) (0.038)** (0.060) (0.038)** (0.060) 
Combat Systems 0.026 -0.048 0.036 -0.030 0.036 -0.029 0.037 -0.028 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)*** (0.018) (0.013)*** (0.018) (0.013)*** (0.018) 
Aviation -0.016 -0.066 -0.004 -0.056 -0.004 -0.056 -0.004 -0.055 
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 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.003)*** (0.002)* (0.003)*** (0.002)* (0.003)*** 
Seaman -0.010 -0.047 -0.007 -0.043 -0.007 -0.042 -0.006 -0.042 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Security -0.005 -0.050 -0.011 -0.058 -0.011 -0.058 -0.012 -0.058 
 (0.005) (0.008)*** (0.009) (0.012)*** (0.009) (0.012)*** (0.009) (0.012)*** 
Communications -0.015 -0.055 -0.012 -0.054 -0.012 -0.053 -0.012 -0.053 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Damage Control 0.001 -0.034 -0.008 -0.045 -0.009 -0.044 -0.009 -0.045 
 (0.003) (0.003)*** (0.015) (0.016)*** (0.015) (0.016)*** (0.015) (0.016)*** 
Missile Tech -0.005 -0.030 -0.005 -0.043 -0.005 -0.042 -0.005 -0.042 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.007) (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007)*** (0.007) (0.007)*** 
Sonar Tech 0.021 -0.009 0.025 -0.004 0.025 -0.003 0.024 -0.004 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.012) (0.008)*** (0.012) (0.008)*** (0.012) 
Info Tech 0.017 -0.072 0.029 -0.068 0.030 -0.068 0.029 -0.068 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** 
Radar Tech 0.049 -0.020 0.052 -0.007 0.052 -0.007 0.052 -0.007 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.004)*** (0.005) (0.004)*** (0.005) 
Intelligence 0.041 -0.014 0.051 -0.008 0.051 -0.008 0.050 -0.008 
 (0.004)*** (0.006)** (0.009)*** (0.013) (0.009)*** (0.013) (0.009)*** (0.013) 
Ops specialist -0.008 -0.064 -0.005 -0.061 -0.005 -0.060 -0.005 -0.060 
 (0.003)** (0.006)*** (0.006) (0.012)*** (0.006) (0.012)*** (0.006) (0.012)*** 
Medical -0.049 -0.095 -0.054 -0.104 -0.053 -0.103 -0.053 -0.103 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
Photography 0.004 -0.045 -0.009 -0.063 -0.008 -0.064 -0.007 -0.063 
 (0.010) (0.012)*** (0.024) (0.046) (0.024) (0.046) (0.024) (0.047) 
Meteorology 0.020 -0.047 0.027 -0.033 0.028 -0.032 0.027 -0.033 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.010)*** 
Musician 0.025 -0.048 -0.044 -0.092 -0.043 -0.092 -0.044 -0.094 
 (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.013)*** 
Admin clerk 0.009 -0.027 0.012 -0.023 0.013 -0.022 0.013 -0.022 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** 
Supply Clerk 0.001 -0.084 0.015 -0.075 0.016 -0.075 0.016 -0.074 
 (0.001) (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** 
Postal Clerk -0.036 -0.108 -0.027 -0.097 -0.026 -0.096 -0.027 -0.096 
 (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)*** (0.015)*** (0.010)** (0.015)*** (0.010)*** (0.015)*** 
Rel Specialist -0.020 -0.102 -0.011 -0.098 -0.010 -0.097 -0.011 -0.097 
 (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.008) (0.014)*** (0.008) (0.014)*** (0.008) (0.014)*** 
SeaBee Engineer -0.014 -0.066 -0.004 -0.050 -0.003 -0.049 -0.003 -0.049 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.005) (0.008)*** (0.005) (0.008)*** (0.005) (0.008)*** 
Int comms -0.014 -0.048 -0.016 -0.076 -0.016 -0.076 -0.017 -0.077 
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 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.010) (0.016)*** (0.010) (0.016)*** (0.011) (0.016)*** 
Ordinance -0.018 -0.080 -0.006 -0.062 -0.005 -0.061 -0.005 -0.061 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.005) (0.009)*** (0.005) (0.009)*** (0.005) (0.009)*** 
Machinist Mate -0.023 -0.063 -0.015 -0.061 -0.014 -0.060 -0.014 -0.060 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** 
Nuclear 0.117 0.129 0.123 0.142 0.123 0.143 0.124 0.143 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** 
Mach Repair 0.023 -0.028 0.026 -0.030 0.026 -0.029 0.027 -0.029 
 (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.015)* (0.030) (0.015)* (0.030) (0.015)* (0.030) 
Elects Mate -0.034 -0.095 -0.037 -0.099 -0.036 -0.097 -0.036 -0.097 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** 
Parachute Rigger 0.022 -0.044 0.016 -0.037 0.016 -0.036 0.016 -0.036 
 (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.009)* (0.015)** (0.009)* (0.015)** (0.009)* (0.015)** 
Culin Specialist -0.024 -0.089 -0.015 -0.073 -0.015 -0.072 -0.014 -0.071 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** 
Ship Servicemen -0.038 -0.143 -0.022 -0.140 -0.021 -0.139 -0.021 -0.139 
 (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.014) (0.016)*** (0.014) (0.016)*** (0.014) (0.015)*** 
Master at Arms 0.045 0.008 0.059 0.031 0.059 0.030 0.058 0.028 
 (0.004)*** (0.007) (0.007)*** (0.015)** (0.007)*** (0.015)** (0.007)*** (0.015)* 
Midshipmen -0.112 -0.182 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.004)*** (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
1995 Cohort 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
1996 Cohort 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.008 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
1997 Cohort 0.021 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
1998 Cohort 0.032 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.032 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
1999 Cohort 0.040 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.039 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
2000 Cohort 0.034 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.033 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
2001 Cohort 0.032 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.032 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
2002 Cohort 0.023 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.012 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) (0.003)*** (0.000) 
2003 Cohort 0.020 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.013 0.000 
 (0.004)*** (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
2004 Cohort 0.027 0.000 -0.067 0.000 -0.066 0.000 -0.070 0.000 
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 (0.020) (0.000) (0.021)*** (0.000) (0.021)*** (0.000) (0.020)*** (0.000) 
NHSDG -0.006 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.003)** (0.000) (0.003)** (0.000) (0.003)** (0.000) 
GED -0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.000 
 (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Some college 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000 
 (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
2 year degree 0.036 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.022 0.000 
 (0.002)*** (0.000) (0.006)*** (0.000) (0.006)*** (0.000) (0.006)*** (0.000) 
4 year degree  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AFQT score 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000) 
Ever take TA   0.018 0.006       
 (0.001)*** (0.002)***       
Pass at least one class   0.009 0.001     
   (0.002)*** (0.002)     
Pass DL class       0.043 0.035 
       (0.005)*** (0.006)*** 
Pass Traditional class       0.004 -0.003 
       (0.002)* (0.002) 
Only non DL      -0.004 -0.007   
     (0.002)** (0.002)***   
Took DL and non DL     0.047 0.042   
     (0.008)*** (0.009)***   
Constant -0.081 0.018 -0.085 0.026 -0.083 0.026 -0.082 0.026 
 (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.001)*** 
Observations 800844 800844 107260 107260 107260 107260 107260 107260 
R-squared 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 
Number of SSN  200211  26815  26815  26815 
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Appendix Table 7. Active Duty Personnel by Fiscal Year and Rank 
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
E1 23,769 22,426 19,944 21,416 19,186 22,164 20,141 
E2 31,175 29,159 26,307 24,302 22,911 19,434 24,320 
E3 57,210 58,300 54,494 50,437 46,043 52,564 50,604 
E4 78,521 73,935 68,157 63,071 63,049 63,183 63,910 
E5 85,771 79,941 75,905 72,063 68,380 67,448 68,591 
E6 69,097 64,776 61,970 58,256 55,100 54,113 52,945 
E7 28,667 26,662 26,534 25,081 23,480 22,494 22,560 
E8 8,350 7,940 7,283 7,135 6,121 5,954 6,128 
E9 3,596 3,115 3,121 3,067 2,909 2,918 2,887 
Total 386,156 366,254 343,715 324,828 307,179 310,272 312,086 
Rank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  
E1 18,915 13,190 11,817 11,682 15,841 14,090  
E2 24,898 22,407 20,024 17,808 15,358 17,009  
E3 53,024 56,299 57,264 58,210 53,788 51,128  
E4 66,949 67,742 65,495 59,022 57,328 52,683  
E5 71,843 75,026 74,910 73,261 70,697 67,780  
E6 53,084 54,028 53,767 54,318 52,773 49,456  
E7 23,610 23,969 24,184 23,465 22,731 23,697  
E8 6,670 6,897 6,896 6,738 7,092 6,607  
E9 3,176 3,191 3,125 3,035 2,855 2,801  
Total 322,169 322,749 317,482 307,539 298,463 285,251  
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center enlisted master file.  Annual numbers derived from first quarter of respective fiscal year.
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Appendix Table 8. TA Participation Rates by Fiscal Year and Instruction Method 
 Overall Traditional DL 
1995 9.0% 8.9% 0.0% 
1996 8.9% 8.9% 0.0% 
1997 9.8% 9.7% 0.3% 
1998 9.9% 9.6% 0.7% 
1999 10.1% 9.6% 1.1% 
2000 10.3% 9.5% 1.4% 
2001 10.3% 9.0% 1.8% 
2002 10.6% 8.9% 2.7% 
2003 13.4% 10.1% 4.6% 
2004 15.2% 9.9% 6.9% 
2005 16.9% 9.9% 8.9% 
2006 17.8% 9.4% 10.7% 
2007 18.0% 8.6% 11.7% 
Source:NETC TA data from NCMIS database files for active duty enlisted sailors participating by method of instruction divided by 
active duty enlisted strengths per year.  DL + Traditional rates can be greater than Overall as some sailors participate in both DL and 
traditional courses in the same year.  
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Appendix Table 9. TA Courses by Fiscal Year and Rank 
Rank 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
E1 840 677 477 372 745 501 509 
E2 3118 2874 2562 2031 2500 2805 2066 
E3 9238 9721 9769 8654 8608 9064 8928 
E4 20024 17649 18271 19641 20057 20047 20569 
E5 30438 25837 26609 29672 30133 31358 32411 
E6 24781 21071 22010 23661 22896 24732 24758 
E7 10877 9294 10401 12084 12229 12629 13224 
E8 2725 2460 2759 3415 3154 3293 3276 
E9 671 546 720 833 919 1142 1147 
Total 102712 90129 93578 100363 101241 105571 106888 
        
Rank 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  
E1 420 403 410 519 675 714  
E2 1841 2087 1862 1917 2240 2838  
E3 8941 10742 11936 11679 11382 11832  
E4 21230 20035 22272 21382 22497 22528  
E5 35386 36347 42746 46467 48558 47921  
E6 25515 26369 33083 39606 42581 39861  
E7 13702 12258 13841 15674 18581 18658  
E8 3683 3505 4002 4401 5582 5308  
E9 1284 1225 1331 1377 1535 1674  
Total 112002 112971 131483 143022 153631 151334  
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